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I didn't read all of the shrink wrap license agreement on my new software
until after I opened it. Apparently I agreed to spend the rest of my life as
a towel boy in Bill Gates' new mansion.'
L Introduction
In September of 1995, Rich and Enza Hill ordered a computer system
from Gateway 2000, Inc. (Gateway).? When the Hills received the computer
system, a "Standard Terms and Conditions Agreement" (Agreement) and a
"Three Year Limited Warranty" (Warranty) accompanied the system.' The
Agreement contained a limited liability clause and a dispute resolution clause
that required the parties to settle any dispute or controversy arising out of the
agreement through arbitration.' Furthermore, the Agreement provided that its
terms would govern the contract between the Hills and Gateway unless the
Hills returned the computer system to Gateway within thirty days.' The Hills,
however, had not seen the Agreement or the Warranty before they ordered the
computer, nor had they received any notice from Gateway that these documents would accompany the computer.'
1. Stephen Y. Chow, Contractingin Cyberspace: The Triumph ofForms?, 41 BOSTON

B.J. 16, 16 (1997) (quoting John Adams's "Dilbert" in THEBOsTON GLOBE, January 14,1997).
2. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-C-4086, 1996 WL 650631, at * 1 (N.D. III. Nov.
7, 1996), rev'd, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
3. Id. at* 2.
4. Id.
5. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
47 (1997).
6. Hill, 1996 WL 650631, at*2.
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After experiencing a series of problems with their computer system, the
Hills sued Gateway.7 They alleged breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment that the arbitration, warranty, and liability clauses were unenforceable.' In considering whether the dispute resolution clause barred the
Hills from pursuing their claim against Gateway in federal court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the Hills'
failure to return the computer within thirty days constituted an acceptance of
Gateway's offer to sell the computer.' Therefore, because the Hills did not
return the computer system, the dispute resolution clause required the Hills to

settle their dispute through arbitration and not in court.

°

Hilly. Gateway2000,Inc." reveals the Seventh Circuit's liberal approach

to contract formation. 2 In particular, Hill illustrates the Seventh Circuit's
willingness to enforce the terms of any contract involving the sale of goods
regardless of whether both parties knew the terms of the contract at the point
of sale. 3 This Note analyzes the Seventh Circuit's approach to accept-or7. Ict
8. Id. at *1. In addition to alleging breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment, the Hills sued Gateway for violations of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the
Magnum-Moss Warranty Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, and the South Dakota Consumer Fraud Act. Id.
9. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 ("By keeping the computer beyond 30 days, the Hills
accepted Gateway's offer, including the arbitration clause.").
10. See id.at 1151 (remanding case to district court with instructions to compel arbitration).
11. 105F.3d 1147(7th Cir. 1997).
12. See Hillv. Gateway 2Q00, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.) (enforcing arbitration
clause that seller included in shipping box because buyer did not return product within specified
time period), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997). In Hill,the court considered whether the Hills'
failure to return their Gateway computer system within 30 days constituted an acceptance of the
terms contained in the box that the seller used to ship the computer. Id. at 1148. Because of
a series of problems with their Gateway computer system, Rich and Enza Hill sued Gateway.
Id Gateway.sought to enforce the arbitration clause that it had included in the terms that it
shipped to the Hills with their computer system. Id. The Hill court found that the Seventh
Circuit's decision in ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenbergapplied to the dispute because both Hill and
ProCDinvolved accept-or-return offers and because the UCC governed both disputes. Id. at
1148-49. The Hill court stated that ProCD "holds that the terms inside a box of software bind
consumers who use the software after an opportunity to read the terms and to reject them by
returning the product." Id at 1148 (construing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452
(7th Cir. 1996)). The Hill court rejected the Hills' attempts to limit the scope of ProCD,and
it emphasized the practical considerations that support the use of accept-or-return offers. Id.
at 1149-50. Finally, the Hill court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
compel the Hills to arbitrate their dispute. Id. at 1150.
13. See id.at 1149 (refusing to limit enforceability ofaccept-or-return offers to particular
types of transactions).
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return offers14 and considers whether the approach is consistent with the
policies of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Part II surveys the current
UCC approach to contract formation. 5 Specifically, Part II identifies the
policies underlying the UCC and outlines the traditional interpretations of its
contract formation provisions. Part III discusses the development of the
Seventh Circuit's approach to accept-or-return offers inProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg 6 and the expansion of that analysis in Hill.7 Part III argues that the
Seventh Circuit's approach to accept-or-return offers misapplies and misinterprets the UCC, favors the seller of goods, and enforces terms that unfairly
surprise the buyer." Part IV examines the May 1998 draft of the National
Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws (N.C.C.U.S.L.) and the
American Law Institute's (A.L.I.) proposed revisions to Article 2 of the UCC
and argues that the provisions do not eliminate the bias toward sellers or the
unfair surprise of accept-or-return offers.' 9 Part IV also analyzes the Article
2 drafting committee's tentative solution to accept-or-return offers and argues
that the proposed solution would remedy the bias and the unfair surprise
inherent in the Seventh Circuit's approach.2" Finally, Part V concludes that
courts should not adopt the Seventh Circuit's approach to accept-or-return
14. See id. at 1150 (describing accept-or-return offer). An accept-or-return offer is an
offer in which the seller proposes that the parties will not form their contract until after the
buyer has the opportunity to inspect and to reject the item and the terms. Id.
15. See infra Part II (explaining current UCC's approach to contract formation).
16. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
17.

See infra Part III (discussing ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg and Hill). In ProCD, the

Seventh Circuit determined that shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). The ProCDcourt considered whether a license that
the seller of computer software enclosed with the directory and the application program it
marketed was enforceable. Id. at 1450. ProCD sought to enforce the terms of the license
agreement it enclosed with its software against a purchaser of the software who offered access
to the directory to third parties via the Internet. Id. The ProCDcourt determined that the
inclusion of the license on the inside of the box, rather than on the outside, did not render the
license unenforceable. Id. at 1451. First, payment of money precedes full disclosure of the
terms of the agreement in many transactions. Id. Second, the UCC permits parties to form
contracts in ways other than at the time of sale. Id. at 1452-53. The ProCDcourt found that
ProCD had proposed a contract that the purchaser could accept by using the product after
having the opportunity to review the terms of the license agreement and, moreover, that the
purchaserhad accepted the contract by using the product. Id. at 1452. Furthermore, the ProCD
court found that federal copyright law did not preempt the enforcement of the license. Id. at
1455. Therefore, the ProCDcourt enforced the terms of ProCD's license. Id. at 1449.
18. See infraPart lII (discussing Seventh Circuit's misguided approach to contract formation).
19. See infraPart IV (discussing proposed revisions to Article 2).
20. See infranotes 295-310 and accompanying text (concluding that drafting committee
should approve statutory solution to problem of accept-or-return offers).
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offers. 21 Part V suggests instead that the N.C.C.U.S.L. and the A.L.I. should
adopt proposed Sections 2-105(b) and 2-204(e) of the May 1998 draft of the
proposed revisions to address the bias and the unfair surprise of accept-orreturn offers.' Additionally, Part V recommends that state legislatures, when

evaluating whether to enact revised Article 2, consider the bias and the unfair
surprise of accept-or-return offers and adopt a specific statutory solution
similar to proposed Sections 2-105(b) and 2-204(e) to address the problem.'
II. Uniform CommercialCode ContractFormation Concepts
A. Pre-CodePrinciplesof ContractFormation

At common law, parties form a contract by objectively24 expressing their
mutual assent to enter into a binding agreement.' In particular, parties mani-

fest their assent to contract through the process of offer and acceptance.26 The
common-law process of offer and acceptance consists in large part of a series
of formal rules. The mirror-image rule and the last-shot doctrine, for example, illustrate the mechanical nature of the common-law approach.28
The mirror-image rule provides that the acceptance of an offer must
match the terms of the offer exactly and that any variation constitutes a
rejection of the offer and a proposal of a counteroffer. 29 However, if the
21. See infra Part V (arguing that courts should not adopt Seventh Circuit's approach to
contract formation).
22. See infra Part V (contending that Article 2 drafting committee should adopt specific
statutory provision to address bias and'unfair surprise of accept-or-return offers).
23. See infraPart V (recommending that state legislatures adopt statutory solution similar
to proposed Sections 2-105(b) and 2-204(e)).
24. See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract
has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.").
25. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 29, at 51-52 (3d ed.
1990) (explaining that parties must express their mutual assent to form contract).
26. See id. § 29, at 52-53 (stating that parties usually express their mutual assent through
offer and acceptance).
27. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.13, at 250-52 (2d
ed. 1998) (discussing common-law requirements for valid acceptance).
28. See Comeill A. Stephens, On Endingthe Battle of the Forms: Problemswith Solutions, 80 KY.L.J. 815, 820 (1991-92) (observing thatpre-Code application ofmirror-image rule
and last-shot doctrine was "mechanical, rigid, and harsh").
29. See Learning Works, Inc. v. LearningAnnex, Inc., 830 F.2d 541,543 (4th Cir. 1987)
(refusing to enforce contract in which terms of acceptance did not mirror terms of offer); see
also Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619, 621-22 (N.Y. 1915) (determining
that buyer proposed counteroffer by including clause in purported acceptance that required
seller to acknowledge buyer's acceptance of offer). Poel provides the classic example of a
formalistic application of the mirror-image rule. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the
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offeror acts upon the contract despite the varying terms of the offeree's purported acceptance, the offeror constructively accepts the terms of the offeree's
counteroffer.3" Furthermore, under the last-shot doctrine, the terms of the
counteroffer will be the terms of the resulting contract.31 The last-shot doctrine, therefore, provides that the last party to send a form determines the
terms of the contract when the other party accepts the counteroffer through
performance."
The mechanical and formalistic application of common-law principles
produces unsatisfactory results in commercial transactions.33 The application
of these principles allows for "welshing" on bona fide agreements,3 4 gives an
unwarranted preference to sellers of goods,35 and produces results that unfairly
surprise one of the parties.36 As a result, the N.C.C.U.S.L. and the A.L.I.
"BattleofForms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1307, 1315 (1986) (stating thatPoelis "classic
illustration of pre-Code, mechanical jurisprudence"). But see Douglas G. Baird & Robert
Weisberg, Rules, Standards,and the Battle of Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L.
REV. 1217, 1235-36 n.52 (1982) (contending that critics place too much emphasis on Poel).
Baird and Weisberg argue that "[t]he decision is altogether exceptional in its rigid application
of the mirror image rule and, in any event, is not so clearly wrong as almost all have readily
concluded." Id.
30. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991)
(explaining that under last-shot rule, if offeror acted on contract despite variance in terms
between offer and acceptance, then terms of counteroffer would bind offeror).
31. See Brewster of Lynchburg, Inc. v. Dial Corp., 33 F.3d 355, 362 (4th Cir. 1994)
(stating that under last-shot doctrine, last terms sent prior to performance constitute contract);
Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining
that at common law, agreement contains terms included in last form sent).
32. See Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 762 (D. Ariz.
1993) (stating that terms of party who sends last form become terms of contract at common
law); see also 1FARNSWORTH, supranote 27, § 3.21, at 298 (arguing that common-law doctrine
favors party who fires "last shot").
33. See Reaction Molding Techs., Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097, 1104
(E.D. Pa.) (observing that mirror-image rule ignored modem business practices and frustrated
business), amended by 588 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Stephens, supra note 28, at 820
(stating that common-law doctrines ignore true intentions and expectations of parties and,
therefore, lead to results that are unjust and detrimental to commerce).
34. See Murray, supra note 29, at 1316 (arguing that application of mirror-image rule
allowed "welsher" to avoid its contractual obligations); Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr,
Redrafting UCC Section 2-207: An Economic Prescriptionfor the Battle of the Forms, 73
DENv. U. L. REv. 403, 405 (1996) (arguing that mirror-image rule allowed parties to ignore
bona fide agreements).
35. See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1580 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting
that purpose ofUCC Section 2-207 was to "reform the infamous common law mirror-image rule
and associated last-shot doctrine that enshrined the fortuitous positions of senders of forms and
accorded undue advantages based on such fortuitous positions").
36. See Caroline N. Brown, RestoringPeace in the Battle of the Forms: A Framework
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promulgated Article 2 of the UCC in an attempt to make contract law more
reflective of modem commercial relationships."
B. Sections 2-204 and 2-206: Principlesof ContractFormation
The underlying purpose of Article 2 is to identify the parties' bargain-infact.38 Sections 2-204 and 2-206 effectuate this purpose in the context of

contract formation by liberalizing the common-law requirements of formal
offer and formal acceptance.39 Therefore, the UCC approach to contract
formation emphasizes the parties' factual bargain 4 rather than the parties'
for Making Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C.L. REV. 893, 901-02
(1991) (illustrating that operation of mirror-image rule and last-shot doctrine "resulted in
seriously unpleasant economic surprise"). Professor Brown illustrates that the effects of the
mirror-image rule caused unfair surprise to one of the parties in two ways. First, under the
mirror-image rule, courts would refuse to enforce an agreement because of variance from the
offer even though the parties thought they had formed a contract. Id. at 902. Second, if the
offeror performed the contract despite the variance, the terms ofthe contract would be the terms
of the counteroffer rather than the terms proposed by the offeror. Id.
37. See Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Industrial Eng'g, Inc., 91 F.3d 1002, 1003 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that Article 2 attempts to harmonize law of contract with realities of commercial
transactions); U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1995) (stating that underlying purpose of UCC is to
"simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions"); see alsoArizona
Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 762 (stating that drafters of UCC sought to abolish "common-law rules
that made little sense in light of modem business practices").
38. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The UnderlyingPhilosophy ofArticle
2 ofthe Uniform CommercialCode, 21 WASHBURNL.J. 1,7 (1981) (arguing that identification
of parties' bargain-in-fact is "quintessential purpose" of Article 2); see also Kleinschmidt Div.
of SCM Corp. v. Futuronics Corp., 395 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (N.Y. 1977) (discussing underlying
philosophy of Article 2). The Kleinschmidt court described the basic philosophy of Article 2:
Practical business people cannot be expected to govern their actions with reference
to nice legal formalisms. Thus, when there is basic agreement, however manifested
and whether or not the precise moment of agreement may be determined, failure to
articulate that agreement in the precise language of a lawyer, with every difficulty
and contingency considered and resolved, will not prevent formation of a contract.
But, of equal importance, if there be no basic agreement, the code will not imply
one.
Id. (citation omitted).
39. See Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc., 713 F. Supp.
1350, 1353-54 (D. Idaho 1989) (stating thatUCC addresses problems associated with commonlaw approach by eliminating need for formal offer and acceptance), rev 'donothergrounds,940
F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1991); Brown, supra note 36, at 899 (describing Article 2's contract
formation policy as effectuating parties' intent by eliminating some mechanical and cumbersome common-law rules).
40. See John E. Murray, Jr., Section 2-207 of the Uniform CommercialCode: Another
Word About Incipient Unconscionability,39 U. PITT. L. REV.597, 600 (1978) (describing
factual bargain as "the actual or presumed assent of the parties").
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adherence to a series of formal rules.4 '
1. Section 2-204: GeneralPrinciplesof ContractFormation
Section 2-20442 establishes the general principles of contract formation.
While Section 2-204 clearly liberalizes the rules for contract formation, 43 it
does not eliminate the requirement that parties objectively manifest their
mutual assent. ' Section 2-204 provides that when parties intend to contract,
the technical rules of offer, acceptance, and indefiniteness will not frustrate
their agreement.45
Section 2-204's three subsections implement Article 2's emphasis on
protecting the factual bargain of the parties by relaxing the formal require41. See Murray, supra note 38, at 5-6 (explaining that Sections 2-204 and 2-206 focus
on parties' factual bargain).
42. U.C.C. § 2-204 (1995). Section 2-204 provides:
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even
though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail
for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
Id. Every state except Louisiana has adopted the official version of Section 2-204. See 2
RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-204:2, at 384-85
(3d ed. 1997) (providing list ofjurisdictions that have adopted Section 2-204).
43. See 1 WILLIAMD.HAWKLANDUNIFORMCOMMERCIALCODESERIES § 2-204:2, at213
(1998) (explaining that Section 2-204 liberalizes rules of contract formation).
44. See DP-Tek, Inc. v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co., 891 F. Supp. 1510, 1517 (D.
Kan. 1995) (stating that Article 2 does not eliminate requirement that "the parties must have
intended to enter into a binding agreement and that there be a mutual manifestation of assent
on... material point[s]"), aff'd, 100 F.3d 828 (10th Cir. 1996); 3 RICHARD W. DUESENBERG
& LAWRENCE P. KING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 4.02, at 4-5 (1997) (stating that Section 2-204 does not displace common-law requirement
of mutual assent to terms of agreement); see also Drug Line, Inc. v. Sero-Immuno Diagnostics,
Inc., 458 S.E.2d 170, 170-71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to enforce contract in which terms
were vague and uncertain); Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) (finding that significant divergence with respect to payment terms and one party's
rejection of other party's proposal did not indicate meeting of minds).
45. See 1 HAWKLAND, supranote 43, § 2-204:2, at 217-18 (explaining thattechnical rules
of offer, acceptance, and indefiniteness will not frustrate formation ofcontract if parties reached
actual agreement); John E. Murray, Jr., Intention Over Terms: An Explorationof UCC§2-207
andNew Section 60 Restatement of Contracts,37 FORDHAML. REv. 317,326 (1969) (emphasizing that flexible provisions of Section 2-204 apply only if parties intend to contract); see also
Computer Network, Ltd. v. Purcell Tire & Rubber Co., 747 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (stating that Section 2-204 requires agreement between negotiating parties).
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ments of offer and acceptance.' Specifically, subsection (1) recognizes that

contracting parties may reach their agreement through oral or written commu-

nications,4 7 through their course of conduct,48 or through a combination
thereof.49 Similarly, subsection (2) eliminates the requirement that parties be
able to pinpoint the exact moment that they reached their agreement." Furthermore, subsection (3) explains that, as long as the parties intended to enter
into a binding agreement, their failure to agree on every term in the contract
does not necessarily render the agreement unenforceable.51 Rather, under
subsection (3), the ultimate test for definiteness52 is whether the parties

46. See Murray, supra note 38, at 5-6 (explaining Section 2-204's emphasis on parties'
factual bargain).
47. See Southeastern Adhesives Co. v. Funder America, Inc., 366 S.E.2d 505, 50708 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that contract was formed when buyer telephoned order to
seller).
48. See Quaker State Mushroom Co. v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1281,
1285 (N.D. I11.1986) (recognizing that conduct of parties may suffice to create contract);
Nebraska Builders Prods. Co. v. Industrial Erectors, Inc., 478 N.W.2d 257, 265 (Neb. 1992)
(stating that parties' conduct supported finding that contract existed).
49. See Crest Ridge Constr. Group, Inc. v. Newcourt, Inc., 78 F.3d 146, 150 (5th Cir.
1996) (finding sufficient evidence of enforceable contract when parties exchanged documents
that industry considered binding and parties' conduct revealed agreement); Fairley v. TuranFoley Imports, Inc., 65 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 1995) (determining that conduct of parties,
viewed in combination with writings exchanged between parties, evidenced that binding
agreement existed).
50. See U.C.C. §2-204(2) (1995) (providing that agreement may constitute contract even
though moment of formation is indeterminable).
51. See Computer Network, Ltd. v. Purcell Tire & Rubber Co., 747 S.W.2d 669, 674
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that failure to agree on all terms does not render contract
unenforceable if parties intended to contract); see also CrestRidge Constr.Group, 78 F.3d at
151 (stating that failure of parties to specify payment terms does not require reversal of jury
verdict awarding contract damages); Step-SaverDataSys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 100
(3d Cir. 1991) (finding contract sufficiently definite despite omission of warranty terms); Barto
v. United States, 823 F. Supp. 1369, 1374 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (stating that absence of price term
is not determinative as to whether binding contract exists); H.C. Schmieding Produce Co. v.
Cagle, 529 So. 2d 243, 248 (Ala. 1988) (finding that agreement in which parties approximated
delivery date as harvesttime was enforceable); KIysar v. Lambert, 887 P.2d 431,437 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1995) (rejecting argument that failure to provide shipment term prevented formation of
contract).
52. See Computer Network, Ltd. v. Purcell Tire & Rubber Co., 747 S.W.2d 669, 676
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that ultimate test for definiteness is whether reasonably certain
basis for giving appropriate remedy exists); see also H.C. Schmieding Produce Co. v. Cagle,
529 So. 2d 243, 248 (Ala. 1988) (describing two-prong test under Section 2-204(3): parties
must have intended to contract, and agreed-upon terms must provide reasonably certain basis
for giving appropriate remedy). The H.C.Schmieding test is not inconsistent with the ComputerNetwork analysis because the requirement that the parties must have intended to contract
applies to all inquiries under Section 2-204. See Computer Network, 747 S.W.2d at 674
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intended to contract5 3 and whether there is a reasonably certain basis for
remedying the breach of the contract. 4
2. Section 2-206: Protectingthe Parties'FactualBargain
Section 2-206"5 establishes the specific rules for determining whether
parties have reached an agreement.16 Similar to Section 2-204, Section 2-206
liberalizes various common-law principles of offer and acceptance that might
otherwise frustrate the parties' factual bargain." In particular, Section 2-206
(stating that Section 2-204 requires agreement between negotiating parties); supranote 44 and
accompanying text (explaining that Section 2-204 does not eliminate requirement of mutual
assent).
53. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 468 A.2d 748, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983) (finding that lower court did not abuse its discretion by finding that omission of terms
showed absence of intent to contract), aff'd, 488 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1985); Novelly Oil Co. v. Mathy
Constr. Co., 433 N.W.2d 628, 632-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (approving finding of trial court
that failure to agree on essential terms evidences lack of intent to be bound).
54. See Cyberchron Corp. v. Caildata Sys. Dev., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 94, 109 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (finding no enforceable contract when parties' failure to agree on two essential terms
meant that court could not determine if parties had performed or had breached contract), aff'd
inpart,vacated inpart,47 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995); Drug Line, Inc. v. Sero-Immuno Diagnostics, Inc., 458 S.E.2d 170, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to enforce "vague, indefinite and
uncertain" contract).
55. U.C.C. § 2-206 (1995). Section 2-206 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall
be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or
by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-conforming
goods, but such a shipment of non-conforming goods does not constitute
an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment
is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer.
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of
acceptance an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time
may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance.
Id. Every state except Louisiana has adopted Section 2-206. See 2 ANDERSON, supra note 42,
§ 2-206:2, at 514-15 (providing list ofjurisdictions that have adopted Section 2-206). Alaska's
version of Section 2-206, the only variation from the official version, includes a special
provision applicable to door-to-door solicitations. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.350
(Michie 1995)).
56. See I HAwKLAND, supra note 43, § 2-206:1, at 245 (stating that Section 2-206 is
relevant to determining whether parties have reached agreement).
57. See Murray, supra note 45, at 327 ("Section 2-206 is designed to overcome the
archaic and unrealistic notion that offerors usually care how their offers are accepted.").

ACCEPT-OR-RETURN OFFERS

1297

gives offerees more flexibility to choose the means or the medium of acceptance than they had under pre-Code common law.58
At common law, the offeror is the master ofthe offer and can specify the
appropriate time, place, and manner of acceptance.5 9 Although Section 2-206
does not abandon this common-law principle,60 subsection (1)(a) requires the
offeror to specify unambiguously the required manner of acceptance.6 Ifthe
offeror does notunambiguously specify the appropriate manner ofacceptance,
the offeree may accept in any reasonable manner62 and by any reasonable
medium.6 3 Likewise, subsection (1)(b) allows a seller more flexibility in
responding to a buyer's offer to purchase goods: The seller can ship the
goods,' promise to ship the goods, or ship nonconforming goods as an accommodation to the buyer. 5 Moreover, subsection (2) allows the offeree to accept
58. See U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (1995) (providing that unless unambiguously indicated
otherwise, party may accept offer "in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances").
59. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 27, § 3.12, at 247 (explaining that at common law,
offeror is master of offer).
60. See Beard Implement Co. v. Krusa, 567 N.E.2d 345, 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(construing Section 2-206 as approving common-law rule that offeror is master of offer (citing
Kroeze v. Chloride Group Ltd., 572 F.2d 1099, 1105 (5th Cir. 1978))); 3 DUESENBERG &KNG,
supranote 44, § 4.02[1], at 4-15 (stating that Section 2-206 preserves rule that offeror can
explicitly provide means and manner of acceptance).
61. See U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 1 (1995) (stating that any reasonable manner of acceptance
is appropriate "unless the offeror has made quite clear that it will not be acceptable").
62. See I JAMES WHrrE& ROBERTSUMMERS, UNIFORMCOMMERCIAL CODE § 1-5, at 34
(4th ed. 1995) (explaining that Section 2-206(1)(a) eliminates presumption that offer calls for
acceptance by return promise and that it allows acceptance by any means reasonable under
circumstances); see also Mead Corp. v. McNally-Pittsburg Mfg. Corp., 654 F.2d 1197, 1204
(6th Cir. 1981) (concluding that purchase order operated as acceptance of offer); Barto v.
United States, 823 F. Supp. 1369, 1374 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (determining that beginning of
performance was effective as acceptance (citing U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 3 (1995))); Essex Crane
Rental Corp. v. Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 (D. Idaho 1989)
(finding that defendant's acceptance of benefits under agreement constituted acceptance of
offer), rev'don other grounds, 940 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1991).
63. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1995).
64. See Winter Panel Corp. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 963, 970 (D. Mass.
1993) (explaining that shipment of goods completes contract under Section 2-206(1)(b)).
65. See Corinthian Pharm. Sys. v. Lederle Lab., 724 F. Supp. 605,611 (S.D. Ind. 1989)
(finding shipment ofnonconforming goods to be accommodation when seller had no obligation
to make shipment and seller sent buyernotification of accommodation); see also3 DUESENBERG
& KING, supra note 44, § 4.02[l], at 4-17 to 4-19 (discussing application of Section
2-206(1)(b)). Duesenberg and King state that the drafters of the UCC intended Section
2-206(1)(b) to cure the problems associated with the "unilateral contract trick." Id. at 4-17.
The unilateral contract trick occurs when a seller ships nonconforming goods and, when sued
for breach of contract, defends on the ground thatthe shipment ofnonconforming goods did not
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an offer by beginning performance if the commencement of performance is a
reasonable mode of acceptance and the offeror receives notification of the
performance within a reasonable time. 6
C. Section 2-207: Divergent Terms in an Acceptance or a Confirmation
Courts and commentators have intensely analyzed67 and criticized68 Section 2-207.69 According to the courts and at least one commentator, the
constitute an acceptance of the offer. Id. Under this theory, therefore, the buyer would have
no contract on which to sue. 1d. at 4-18.
66. See U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 3 (1995) (explaining conditions under which beginning of
performance can be valid acceptance).
67. See generallyBaird & Weisberg, supra note 29 (arguing that formal rules of contract
formation are fundamentally sound and may provide better results than Section 2-207); Paul
Barron & Thomas W. Dunfee, Two Decades of§ 2-207: Review, Reflection andRevision, 24
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 171 (1975) (analyzing application of Section 2-207 and proposing revision);
Brown, supra note 36 (arguing that Section 2-207 restores common-law balance of power
between offeror and offeree in contract formation when parties use preprinted forms and
proposing methodology for applying Section 2-207); Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Castles in the
Air: BlanketAssent andthe Revision ofArticle 2, 51 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 599 (1994) (arguing
that drafters of Revised Article 2 should eliminate Section 2-207 and notion of blanket assent);
Murray, supra note 38 (explaining importance of interpreting Article 2 consistently with its
underlying purpose of identifying parties' factual bargain); Murray, supra note 29 (analyzing
problems of interpreting and construing Section 2-207); Murray, supra note 45 (discussing
application ofSection 2-207 to purported acceptance that contains additional or different terms);
John E. Murray, Jr., A ProposedRevisionofSection 2-207 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, 6
J.L. & COM. 337 (1986) (discussing problematic applications of Section 2-207 and suggesting
new draft of that section); Murray, supra note 40 (examining analyses of Section 2-207 that
suggestvariance with underlying policies ofsection); Stephens, supranote28 (considering Code
approachto battle-of-forms and proposing solution); E. HunterTaylor, Jr., UC.C.Section 2-207:
An IntegrationofLegalAbstractionsand TransactionalReality,46 U. CIN. L. REv. 419 (1977)
(discussing application of Section 2-207 to battle-of-forms situation); Charles M. Thatcher, A
Critique of the Murray Model for Revising UC.C. § 2-20 7 and a Derivative Proposalfor
Revision, 39 S.D. L. REV. 93 (1994) (evaluating Professor Murray's model for revising Section
2-207 and suggesting derivative proposal); Gregory M. Travalio, Clearing the Air After the
Battle: ReconcilingFairnessandEfficiency in a FormalApproachto U C. C. Section 2-207, 33
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 327 (1983) (evaluating approaches to Section 2-207 and proposing
alternative methodology). It is beyond the scope ofthis Note to provide a detailed analysis ofthe
many issues arising from courts' and commentators' interpretations of Section 2-207.
' 68. See Reaction Molding Techs., Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097, 1104
(E.D. Pa.) (comparing Section 2-207 to "defiant, lurking demon patiently waiting to condemn
its interpreters to the depths of despair"), amended by 588 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Southwest Eng'g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 473 P.2d 18,25 (Kan. 1970) (describing Section 2207 as "murky bit of prose"); 3 DUESENBERG &KING, supra note 44, § 3.03, at 3-12 (describing
Section 2-207 as "one of the most important, subtle, and difficult in the entire Code, and well
it may be said that the product as it reads is not altogether satisfactory").
69. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995). Section 2-207 provides:
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drafters of Article 2 designed Section 2-207 to preserve the parties' factual
agreement despite variances between the responsive documents. 0 In addition,
Section 2-207 promotes neutrality" and avoids unfair surprise" by abandoning common-law rules that preferred one party over another.
Section 2-207 applies in the following two situations: (1) one or both
parties to an oral or an informal contract send to the other party a written
confirmation that includes the contract terms and terms the parties have not
yet discussed, and (2) the offeree's purported acceptance contains additional
or different terms from the offer.73 Section 2-207 has three distinct provisions. Subsection (1) explains that a party does not prevent the formation of
a contract by including additional or different terms in an acceptance or a
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though
it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection td'them has already been given or is given within
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not
otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provision of this Act.
Id. Every state except Louisiana has adopted Section 2-207. See 2 ANDERSON, supranote 42,
§ 2-207:2, at 558-59 (providing list ofjurisdictions that have adopted Section 2-207). Massachusetts and Montana have varied from the official version by including the word "or different"
in subsection (2) after"additional." Idat 559 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-207 (1995)
and MONT. CODEANN. § 30-2-207 (1995)).
70. See Leonard Pevar Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 524 F. Supp. 546, 550 (D. Del. 1981)
(explaining that drafters of UCC intended to preserve parties' agreement despite additional
terms of standardized forms); Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041,
1047 (II. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that general purpose of Section 2-207 is to allow parties to
enforce their agreements despite discrepancies in offer and acceptance or in contract and written
confirmation); Brown, supra note 36, at 901 ("Mhe principal function of section 2-207 is to
prevent the inevitable discrepancies between forms from defeating the commercial expectation
that their exchange results in an enforceable contract.").
71. See Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440,1444 (9th Cir. 1986)
(stating that neutrality is one principle underlying Section 2-207).
72. See Murray, supra note 29, at 1360 (asserting that primary purpose of Section 2-207
is avoiding unfair surprise and oppression).
73. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (1995).
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written confirmation unless the party makes the acceptance conditional on the
other party's assent to the terms.' Subsection (2) provides situations in which
additional terms that a party proposes in an acceptance or a written confirmation become part of the contract.75 Finally, subsection (3) states that the conduct of the parties may establish a contract, and it determines the terms of a
contract that the parties form through their conduct.76
1. Do the Parties' Writings or ConductEstablish a Contract?
The general rule under Section 2-207(1) is that a definite expression of
acceptance or a written confirmation of an oral agreement operates as an
acceptance even though it contains terms additional to or different from the
terms ofthe offer.7 7 In regard to written confirmations, subsection (1) clarifies
that a confirmation that varies from the terms of the contract does not negate
contractual intent.78 Rather, terms in a confirmation that add to the terms of
the contract
become proposals for modification of the contract under Section
2-207(2). 7
Subsection (1) abandons the common law mirror-image rule8" for transac-

tions under Article 2 by turning common-law counteroffers into acceptances. 81
However, although Section 2-207(1) abandons the common-law rule that any
disparity from an offer in an acceptance constitutes a counteroffer, subsection
(1) preserves the right of the offeree to make a counteroffer. 2 It does so by
74. Id. § 2-207(1).
75. Id. § 2-207(2).
76. Id. § 2-207(3).
77. See Ralph Shrader, Inc. v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 833 F.2d 1210, 1213 (6th Cir. 1987)
(stating general rule of Section 2-207(1)).
78. See Brown, supra note 36, at 940-41 (explaining that subsection (1) clarifies that
confirmation which differs from terms of contract does not negate contractual intent).
79. See Leonard Pevar Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 524 F. Supp. 546, 550 (D. Del. 1981)
(applying Section 2-207(2) to additional terms in written confirmation). Courts generally do
not consider whether a written confirmation is conditional on the offeror's assent to the new or
different terms. See id. at 550 n.17 (explaining that proviso of subsection (1) does not apply
to written confirmations); Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1048
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (determining that party cannot make written confirmation conditional on
other party's assent to new or different term because parties have already formed contract).
80. See supranotes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing common law mirror-image
rule).
81. See Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating
that UCC drafters designed subsection (1) to alter common law mirror-image rule); Arizona
Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 1993) (stating that
Article 2 turns pre-Code counteroffers into acceptances).
82. See 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 43, § 2-207:2, at 266 (explaining that while purpose
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providing that a party may make acceptance expressly conditional on the
offeror's assent to the new or different terms.8 3
In determining whether an acceptance that varies from the terms of the
offer operates as an acceptance, subsection (1) directs courts to make two
inquiries.84 First, the court must determine whether the purported acceptance
is a definite and timely expression of acceptance.85 Second, subsection (1)
requires that courts determine whether the offeree has made the acceptance
expressly conditional on the offeror's assent to the new or different terms.86
Under the traditional approach, an acceptance is conditional on assent only if
the acceptance clearly reveals that the offeree is unwilling to proceed8 7with the
transaction unless the offeror assents to the new or different terms.
If the court determines either that the offeree did not express the acceptance definitely or that the offeree made the acceptance expressly conditional
of Section 2-207(1) is to overturn mirror-image rule, subsection (1) preserves right of offeree
to make counteroffer).
83. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1995) (precluding formation of contract if offeree makes acceptance conditional on offeror's assent to new or different terms).
84. See id.(requiring purported acceptance to be "definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance" and not be "expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms").
85. See id. (stating that expression of acceptance must be definite and seasonable); see
also Dorton, 453 F.2d at 1166 (explaining that Sections 2-204 and 2-206 determine whether
offeree has definitely expressed intent to accept offer).
86. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1995) (stating that purported acceptance is not operative ifofferee
expressly conditions acceptance on offeror's assent to new or different terms).
87. See Dorton v. Collins &Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th Cir. 1972) (developing traditional test for determining whether offeree's acceptance is conditional on offeror's
assent to new or different terms); see also McJunkin Corp. v. Mechanicals, Inc., 888 F.2d 481,
488 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that proviso applied when offeree's form of acceptance tracked
language ofsubsection (1)); Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1444
(9th Cir. 1986) (determining that proviso of Section 2-207(1) applied because acceptance
tracked language of statute); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 92627 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that provision which stated that acceptance constituted agreement
to all terms in form did not constitute acceptance conditional on assent); Mace Indus., Inc. v.
Paddock Pool Equip. Co., 339 S.E.2d 527, 530 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to find provision
which stated that acceptance was subject to its terms to be within exception of Section 2207(1)). But see Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962)
(determining that response which materially altered contract to offeror's disadvantage was
conditional acceptance), overruledby Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184 (1st
Cir. 1997); cf Ralph Shrader, Inc. v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 833 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (6th Cir.
1987) (applying proviso of subsection (1)to case in which offeree stated that its acceptance was
only on given terms and that offeror should have advised offeree immediately if terms were
unacceptable); Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505, 509 (7th
Cir. 1968) (finding that proviso applied when offeree predicated acceptance on modification,
clarification, or addition).
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on the offeror's assent to the new or different terms, the transaction aborts. 8
Therefore, after determining that an acceptance is indefinite or conditional,
courts can find the existence of an enforceable agreement in only two ways.
First, the court can find that the other party expressly assented to the terms of
the purported acceptance.89 Under the majority approach, the acceptance of
the goods is not sufficient to constitute assent to the counterofferee's terms.'
Second, if the parties' subsequent conduct reveals that the parties believe that
they have entered into a binding agreement, their conduct can establish a
contract under subsection (3).1
Subsection (3), therefore, applies when the parties' writings do not form
a contract but their conduct indicates the existence of a binding agreement.'
In such circumstances, Comment 7 to Section 2-207 indicates that the general
principles of Section 2-204 determine whether the parties have reached a
binding agreement. According to subsection (3), the terms of a contract
based on conduct are the terms on which the writings of the parties agree and
the applicable supplementary terms of the UCC.94
2. What Are the Terms of the Contract?
Subsection (2) of Section 2-207 applies in two situations. First, subsection (2) applies if the offeree's expression of acceptance is sufficiently definite and the offeree does not condition acceptance on assent to additional or
different terms.9" Second, if at least one of the parties to the contract sends a
88. See Dorton v. Collins &Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161,1166 (6th Cir. 1972) (explaining that "entire transaction aborts" upon court's finding that offeree conditioned acceptance on
offeror's assent to new or different terms).
89. See Diamond FruitGrowers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9thCir. 1986)
(recognizing that offeror can assent to terms of offeree's conditional acceptance).
90. See Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 1997) (determining that acceptance of goods is insufficient to show assent when terms of parties' forms
conflict).
91. See McJunkin Corp. v. Mechanicals, Inc., 888 F.2d 481,488 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding
that parties' course of conduct established contract under subsection (3)).
92. See Frank M. Booth, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 754 F. Supp. 1441,1448 (E.D. Cal.
1991) (concluding that parties' conduct evidenced contract under subsection (3)); Album
Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (II1. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that
Section 2-207(3) applies when parties behave as if they have contract even though writings of
parties do not establish binding agreement).
93. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 7 (1995); see supranotes 42-54 and accompanying text (discussing Section 2-204's principles of contract formation).
94. Id. § 2-207(3).
95. Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1169-70 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating
that if offeree does not make acceptance conditional on assent to new or different terms, new
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written confirmation of an oral or an informal contract, subsection (2) is the
operable provision.9 6 Under those two circumstances, the additional terms in
an acceptance or a written confirmation are proposals for modification of the
contract.97 In a transaction involving a consumer, the common-law rule states
that additional terms become part of the contract only if the offeror agrees to
the terms. 98 However, if the transaction is between merchants, Section
2-207(2) provides that the additional terms become part of the contract unless
the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer, the terms
materially alter the contract, or the other party objects to the terms.99
Section 2-207 does not specifically explain what types of terms materially alter a contract,' ° and most courts purport to inquire into the facts of each
individual case rather than adopt per se rules of materiality." ' Specifically,
courts, consistent with Comment 4 to Section 2-207,"°2 focus on the degree of
or different terms are proposals for modification of contract under subsection (2)).
96. Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1985)
(finding that subsection (2) determines whether additional terms in written confirmation become
part of contract).
97. See id.at 1123 (determining that analysis under Section 2-207(2) is same for acceptances and confirmations). Subsection (2) does not provide explicitly the analysis for determining whether terms in the offeree's response that differ from the terms of the offer become part
of the contract. See Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994)
(discussing application of Section 2-207(1) when offeree's response contains terms that differ
from terms of offer). Three possible approaches to this problem are as follows: (1) discrepant
terms drop out of the contract and the Code's default terms fill the resulting gap; (2) offeree's
discrepant terms fall out of the contract and offeror's terms become part of the contract; or (3)
new terms in acceptance that are notmaterially differentfrom the terms of the offer become part
of the contract. See id. (describing three approaches to terms in acceptance that differ from
terms of offer). The majority view is that discrepant terms fall out of the contract and that UCC
replaces the terms with a gap-filler. Id. at 1178 (finding that Illinois would most likely adopt
majority approach).
98. See 3 DUFSENBERG & KING, supra note 44, § 3.03[1], at 3-19 (stating that unless
transaction is between merchants, parties must accept or assent to additional terms); 1
HAWKLAND, supra note 43, § 2-207:3, at 275 (explaining that unless transaction involves
merchants, parties must agree to additional or different terms).
99. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1995).
100. See id.§ 2-207 cmts. 4 & 5 (providing examples of material and nonmaterial alterations).
101. See Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Industrial Eng'g, Inc., 91 F.3d 1002, 1008 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that issue of materiality requires inquiry into parties' relationship, expectations,
and course ofdealing); Bergquist Co. v. Sunroc Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1236,1245 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(stating thatperse rule is contrary to UCC's emphasis on circumstances surrounding contractual
relationship). Butsee Winter Panel Corp. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 963,971 (D.
Mass. 1993) (agreeing with line of cases which found that damage limitation clauses are
material alterations and stating that damage limitation clauses are significant in any contract).
102. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (1995).
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surprise or hardship that the inclusion of the term would impose on the
nonassenting party."°3 In deciding whether a term materially alters the contract, courts have focused on the prior dealings between the parties," the
customs of the industry,"0 5 the alteration in distribution of risk between the
parties, 10 6 and the economic hardship on a party that the term imposes. 0 7
III Seventh Circuit'sApproach to ContractFormation
The UCC presents a flexible approach to contract formation."0 8 In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, °9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit liberally applied the UCC contract formation provisions and recognized the enforceability ofan accept-or-return offer in the context of computer
software. " Subsequently, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.," the Seventh Cir103. See Trans-Aire Int'l, Inc. v.NorthernAdhesiveCo., 882 F.2d 1254,1260-61 (7thCir.
1989) (stating that term is material alteration if surprise or hardship would result if one party
incorporated term without express awareness of other party (citing U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4
(1995))).
104. See Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709, 714-15 (7th Cir.
1987) (finding that evidence of prior course of dealings is relevant as to unfair surprise); Dixie
Aluminum Prods. Co. v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 785 F. Supp. 157, 160 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (stating
that course of dealing between parties is relevant to issue of unfair surprise).
105. See Herzog Oil Field Serv., Inc. v. Otto Torpedo Co., 570 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1990) (determining that interest term was not material alteration because common practice
in commercial transactions is to charge interest on balances).
106. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3d Cir. 1991)
(stating that disclaimer of warranty and limitation of remedies provision altered distribution of
risk and did not become part of parties' agreement under Section 2-207(2)).
107. See Trans-Aire Int'l, 882 F.2d at 1262 (concluding that indemnification clause
imposes significant economic hardship).
108. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing underlying purpose of
Article 2).
109. See infra notes 117-76 and accompanying text (discussing ProCD).
110. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing
shrinkwrap license). Prior to ProCD,no courts enforced shrinkwrap licenses. See Step-Saver
Data Sys., 939 F.2d at 105 (finding that terms of box-top license were not part of parties'
agreement); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc., v. Software Link, 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993)
(concluding that terms of license agreement were not part of agreement between parties). See
generally Darren C. Baker, Note, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Commercial Reality, Flexibility in
ContractFormation,andNotions ofManifestedAssent in the Arena ofShrinkwrap Licenses,
92 Nw. U. L. REV. 379 (1997) (examining implications of ProCD for law concerning
enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses); Christopher L. Pitet, Note, The Problem with "Money
Now, Terms Later": ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of "Shrinkwrap"
Software Licenses, 31 LOY.L.A.L. REV.325 (1997) (discussing history of shrinkwrap licenses
and analyzing enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses in ProCD).
111. See infra notes 177-96 and accompanying text (discussing Hill).
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cuit expanded its ruling in ProCDand determined that accept-or-return offers
are enforceable in any commercial transaction.' 12 Specifically, by finding that
the parties do not form a contract until after the buyer receives and does not
return the product, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the buyer accepts all the
seller's contract terms that accompany the delivered product if the buyer fails
to return the product.'
However, the Seventh Circuit's analysis of accept-or-return offers is
subject to three criticisms. First, the Seventh Circuit misapplies and misinterprets the contract formation provisions of the current UCC."' Second, the
court unwarrantedly favors the seller of goods." 5 Third, the court enforces
terms that unfairly surprise one of the parties." 6
A. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg
ProCD, Inc. (ProCD) created and sold a national directory that listed the
names, street addresses, telephone numbers, zip codes, and, when appropriate,
industry codes of over 95,000,000 residential and commercial listings." 7
Under various trade names, including the trademark name "Select Phone,"
ProCD sold CD-ROM discs containing both the directory and the software
needed to access, retrieve, and download the information.'
In the boxes
containing the discs, ProCD included a user guide that contained a series of
terms under the heading "Single User License Agreement." " 9 Small print on
the outside of the Select Phone box referred to the enclosed agreement, but it
112. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.) ("ProCDis about the
law of contract, not the law of software."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
113. See id. at 1150 (determining that Hills accepted terms of Gateway's offer by failing

to return computer within 30 days).
114. See infra notes 197-242 and accompanying text (arguing that Seventh Circuit
misapplies Sections 2-204 and 2-206 and misinterprets Section 2-207).
115. See infranotes 243-53 and accompanying text (contending that Seventh Circuit favors
seller of goods by enforcing accept-or-return offers).
116. See infranotes254-61 and accompanying text (claimingthat Seventh Circuit enforces

terms that unfairly surprise one party).
117. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996).
118. Id.
119. Id. The opening paragraph of the license agreement states:
Please read this license carefully before using the software or accessing the listings
contained on the discs. By using the discs and the listings licensed to you, you
agree to be bound by the terms of this License. If you do not agree to the terms of
this License, promptly return all copies of the software, listings that may have been
exported, the discs and the User Guide to the place where you obtained it.
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did not detail the agreement's specific terms. 2 ' The agreement, the computer
screen that appeared upon installation of the software, the field that appeared
on the computer, screen before the user could access the listings, and the
warnings that appeared on most of the screens all informed the user that
ProCD copyrighted the software and that the user could copy the software
only for authorized purposes.' 2 '
In 1994, Matthew Zeidenberg, a computer-science student, purchased a
copy of Select Phone from a retail store."2 In 1995, Zeidenberg purchased an
updated version of Select Phone."2 Also in 1995, Zeidenberg formed the
corporation Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. (Silken Mountain) for the
purpose of establishing a database of telephone listings over the Internet. 124
After incorporation, Silken Mountain began assembling its own telephone
listings database by using data from Select Phone and data from another
company's product." Silken Mountain also created a computer program that
allowed users to search for listings on its database.'26 In May of 1995, Silken
Mountain contracted with Branch Information Services for Internet access.127
After learning that Silken Mountain was providing the database to third
parties via the Internet, ProCD immediately demanded that Silken Mountain
terminate its activities. 12 Although he admitted to ProCD that he had downloaded data from Select Phone, Zeidenberg refused to stop providing access
to the database over the Internet. 129 Consequently, ProCD sued Zeidenberg
and Silken Mountain 30 alleging breach of the software licensing agreement
and seeking injunctive relief."' In response, Zeidenberg argued that the terms
120. Id. at 645.

121. Id. at 644-45.
122. Id. at 645.
123. Id.
124. Id. Zeidenberg was the sole shareholder, sole employee, and sole officer of Silken

Mountain. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. After learning of ProCD's demand that Zeidenberg discontinue the service,
Branch Information Services terminated its relationship with Silken Mountain Web Services
(Silken Mountain). Id. Silken Mountain later entered into a contract with Ivory Tower
Information Services for Internet access. Id.
130. Because Zeidenberg did not argue that different restrictions applied to Silken
Mountain than applied to him, the author discusses only the arguments advanced by Zeidenberg.
131. Id. at 644. In addition to the breach of contract claim, ProCD alleged violations of
the federal Copyright Act, the Wisconsin Computer Crimes Act, the state misappropriation
statute, and state unfair competition regulations. Id.
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of the software licensing agreement were not enforceable against him and that
federal copyright law preempted ProCD's claims." 2 In September of 1995,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin issued
a preliminary injunction against Zeidenberg that prevented him from distributing the Select Phone directory over the Internet.'
In ruling on the parties' motions for summaryjudgment, the district court
determined whether the terms of the software license agreement bound
35
Zeidenberg. 34 Because the sale of software is essentially a sale of goods,
2 of the UCC controlled the enforceability of the
the court found that Article
"shrinkwrap license."' 36 Specifically, the court considered the application of
132. Id.
133. Id. at 645-46.
134. See id.at 650 (analyzing whether user agreement was enforceable under UCC). In
addition to ruling on the breach of contract claim, the district court considered whether
Zeidenberg infringed on ProCD's copyright and whether federal law preempted the license
agreement. Id. at 644. The district court found that Zeidenberg's use of Select Phone's
software was not inconsistent with ProCD's copyright. Id. at 647-50. Furthermore, the court
concluded that federal copyright law preempted ProCD's breach of contract, misappropriation,
and unfair competition claims. Id. at 657-59. Likewise, the court determined that federal
copyright law preempted the alleged violations of the Wisconsin Computer Crimes Act. Id. at
655-62. Therefore, even if the terms of the software license agreement bound Zeidenberg,
federal copyright law prohibited the enforcement of that contract. Id. at 657-59.
135. See id. at 650-51 (determining thatArticle 2 applies to sale ofsoftware). Most courts
that have considered the issue of whether Article 2 applies to software licensing agreements
have determined that the sale of software is a sale of goods and, therefore, have applied Article
2 to disputes arising from the sale of software. See, e.g., Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma
Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying UCC to dispute arising from sale of
software); Comshare, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1142, 1145 n.2 (6th Cir. 1994) (observing
that" [c]ourts and academic commentators have been moving toward the position that computer
software is a 'good' covered by the sales provisions of the Code"); Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys
Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 674-76 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that software falls within UCC definition
of"good"); NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (N.D. Okla. 1997)
(observing that majority of courts have determined that Article 2 applies to software licensing
agreements). But see Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314,
317-20 (Ind.Ct. App. 1986) (finding that contract to provide computer programming was contract for services and, therefore, did not fall within Article 2); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory,
434 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (determining that Article 2 did not apply to contract
for development of computer program because contract was predominantly for services). The.
N.C.C.U.S.L. and the A.L.I. have proposed the addition of Article 2B to the UCC to govern
licenses and software contracts. See U.C.C. § 2B-103(a) (Tentative Draft April 1998) (providing that Article 2B applies to licenses and to software contracts). The adoption of Article 2B
would resolve the issue of whether the UCC applies to a software license.
136. See Mark A. Lemley, IntellectualPropertyandShrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.CAL. L.
REv. 1239, 1241 (1995) (describing shrinkwrap licenses). According to Professor Lemley,
"[t]he prototypical example [of a shrinkwrap license] is a single piece of paper containing
license terms which has been wrapped in transparent plastic along with one or more computer
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Sections 2-206,137 2-207,' and 2-209 39 to the alleged contract. 4
The court rejected ProCD's claim thatunder Section 2-206, the formation
of the contract was not complete until after Zeidenberghad the opportunity to
inspect and to reject the terms of the agreement. 41 Rather, the court decided
that Zeidenberg accepted ProCD's offer to sell Select Phone when he purchased the product. 42 Accordingly, the court found that the parties formed
the contract at the time of sale. 43 Thus, Zeidenberg accepted the contract
before he received the terms of the shrinkwrap license. Therefore, the terms
could become part of the contract only through the reference to the agreement
on the outside of the box, as a modification under Section 2-207, or as a
modification under Section 2-209.14
In addressing whether the terms became part of the contract, the district
court relied on Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology'45 and
Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.146 for its analysis. 7 In
disks." Id. (footnote omitted). The theory behind the use of the shrinkwrap license is that the
software purchaser will read the license before opening the package and using the software. Id.
Professor Lemley observes that the term "shrinkwrap license" includes licenses printed on
the outside of the box, licenses included within the box, and licenses shrinkwrapped with
the manual. Id.; see ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640,650 (W.D. Wis.) (determining that Article 2 governs enforceability of shrinkwrap license), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996).
137. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text (providing analysis of Section 2-206).
138. See supranotes 67-107 and accompanying text (providing analysis of Section 2-207).
139. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (1995) (allowing parties to modify contract). Section 2-209
allows parties to a contract to modify the terms of an existing contract. See Arizona Retail Sys.,
Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 763 (D. Ariz. 1993) ("Section 2-209 picks up
where section 2-207 leaves off- i.e., after the formation of the contract.").
140. See ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 651 (discussing possible approaches to analyzing alleged
contract under UCC).
141. See id. at 651-52 (rejecting ProCD's argument that acceptance was contingent on
Zeidenberg's rights of inspection, rejection, or revocation).
142. See id. at 652 (stating that contract formed when buyer purchased product).
143. See id. ("Defendant accepted plaintiffs offer to sell Select Phone in a reasonable
manner at the moment they purchasedthe product by exchanging money for the program."
(emphasis added)).
144. See id. at 652-53 (discussing two possible methods for analyzing alleged contract:
(1) whether reference to user agreement on outside of box incorporated terms into contract, or
(2) whether terms of user agreement modified contract under Section 2-207 or Section 2-209).
145. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
146. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
147. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 652 (W.D. Wis.) (finding that StepSaver and Arizona Retail provide insight into application of UCC), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th
Cir. 1996). The ProCDcourt observed that Step-Saver andArizonaRetail were the two leading
cases on the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses. Id.
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both Step-Saver and Arizona Retail, the courts found that the terms of a
shrinkwrap license could not be part of an initial offer to sell a product if the
buyer was unaware of the terms prior to ordering and to receiving the software. 48 As a result, the Step-Saver and Arizona Retail courts considered
whether the terms of the license became part of the contract through the
reference to the license on the outside of the product's package or as a contract modification under Section 2-207 or Section 2-209.'4 In Step-Saverand
Arizona Retail, the courts concluded that the terms of the shrinkwrap license
In Step-Saver, the court considered whether, under Section 2-207, the parties' contract
included the terms contained in a box-top license that the seller printed on a computer program's package. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 95-98 (3d Cir. 1991).
First, the Step-Saver court found that even without the terms of the box-top license, the contract
was sufficiently definite. Id. at 100. Second, after considering the three tests that courts use to
determine if a writing constitutes a conditional acceptance, the Step-Saver court found that the
box-top license did not constitute a conditional acceptance. Id. at 101-03. According to the
Step-Saver court, the acceptance was not conditional because the seller did not clearly express
its unwillingness to proceed with the transaction unless the parties incorporated the box-top
license into their agreement. Id. Third, the Step-Saver court found that a party could not establish a course of conduct sufficient to incorporate an otherwise excluded term by repeatedly
sending a term to the other party if neither party takes action on the term. Id. at 103-04. Fourth,
the court determined that because the inclusion of the box-top license terms would materially
alter the contract, the terms did not become part of the parties' agreement. Id. at 105. Therefore, the Step-Saver court concluded that the parties did not intend the terms of the box-top
license to express the terms of their agreement Id. at 106.
In Arizona Retail,the court considered whether terms in a license agreement that accompanied the delivery of software became part of the parties' agreement. Arizona Retail Sys., Inc.
v. Software Link, 831 F. Supp. 759, 760 (D. Ariz. 1993). Arizona Retail Systems (ARS)
engaged in two sets of transactions with The Software Link (TSL). Id. at 763. In the initial
transaction, TSL sent ARS both an evaluative copy and a live copy of software to which TSL
had affixed a shrinkwrap license. Id. As to the initial transaction, the Arizona Retail court
found that the parties formed their contract when ARS opened the shrinkwrap license because
ARS had notice of the terms. Id. As to the subsequent purchases of software, the Arizona
Retail court found that the license agreement was a proposal to modify the parties' contract.
Id. at 765. However, because ARS never expressly assented to the terms, the Arizona Retail
court found that the terms of the license did not become part of the contract. Id.
148. See ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 653 (stating that Step-Saver and Arizona Retail courts
determined that terms of shrinkwrap license were not part of agreement to order and ship
software (citing Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105-06; Arizona Retail,831 F. Supp. at 763-66)). The
Arizona Retail court's analysis differed from the Step-Saver court's analysis because in
Arizona Retail,in the initial transaction, the seller sent the buyer both an evaluative copy of the
software and a live copy that the seller had affixed with the shrinkwrap license. Id. Because
the buyer opened the live copy only after using the evaluative copy, the Arizona Retail court
found that the terms of the shrinkwrap license became part of the contract. Id. However, the
Arizona Retailcourt found that the shrinkwrap license terms did not become part of subsequent
transactions and that in those transactions, the parties formed their agreement at the point of
sale. Id.
149. See id (describing Step-Saver and Arizona Retail courts' analyses).
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did not become part of the parties' contract.150
Consistent with Step-Saver and Arizona Retail, the district court in
ProCDconsidered whether the terms of the shrinkwrap license became part
of the contract through the reference to the agreement on the box, Section
2-207, or Section 2-209.' First, the district court found that the reference to
the shrinkwrap license on the box did not incorporate the terms into the agreement because Zeidenberg did not have a reasonable opportunity to review the
terms.15 Second, regardless of whether Section 2-207 or Section 2-209
applied to the alleged contract, the district court determined that the terms did
not become part of the agreement under either section because Zeidenberg did
not expressly agree to them. 53 The court, therefore, concluded that the terms
of the shrinkwrap license did not bind Zeidenberg' 54 ProCD appealed the
district court's refusal to enforce the terms of the shrinkwrap license to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.15
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the terms of the user
agreement prifited on the inside, rather than on the outside, of the box were
enforceable.' 56 First, in finding that the terms of the user agreement bound
150. See id. at 652 (explaining that both Step-Saver and Arizona Retail courts found
shrinkwrap licenses unenforceable).
151. See id. at 654-55 (considering whether terms of shrinkwrap license became part of
contract through reference to agreement on outside of product's package or as modification
under Section 2-207 or Section 2-209).
152. See id. at 654 (deciding that terms of user agreement were not 'incorporated into
contract even though reference to agreement appeared on outside of box). The court found that
Zeidenberg's second and third purchases of Select Phone were not subject to the terms of the
license agreement because parties should have the opportunity to review theterms thatwill bind
them every time they contract. Id. The court emphasized that the parties should have this
opportunity because of the possibility that the seller will alter the terms between different
versions of their product. Id.
153. See id. at 655 (finding that contract did not include terms of user agreement under
Section 2-209 or Section 2-207 because Zeidenberg did not expressly assent to terms). The
ProCDcourt stated that Section 2-209 requires a party to assent expressly to any proposed
modification of the contract. Id. The ProCD court found that a party's continuation with an
agreement, however, does not necessarily constitute assent. Id.
154. See id.(concluding that user agreement did not bind Zeidenberg because he did not
have opportunity to bargain or to object to proposed agreement and because he did not expressly assent to terms).
155. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (reviewing
holding of district court).
156. See id. (reviewing holding of district court). The Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court's determination that even if the software license agreement was enforceable, federal
copyright law preempted the enforcement of that contract. Id. at 1453-55; see supranote 134
(discussing district court's finding that federal copyright law preempted enforcement of software
license agreement). It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss and to critique the court's
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Zeidenberg, the court of appeals emphasized the liberal provisions of contract
formation that Section 2-204 embodies.157 Second, the court of appeals pragmatically justified its ruling by recognizing the prevalence of transactions in
which payment precedes the communication of detailed terms. 58
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that a contract includes
only those provisions to which the parties agree. 59 However, the court of
appeals indicated that the UCC envisions a liberal approach to the formation
of contracts that prevents the dismissal of an alleged contract simply because
the offeror included the terms on the inside, rather than on the outside, of the
product's box. 6 ' In particular, according to the Seventh Circuit, Section
2-204(1) permits parties to form contracts in many ways.'6 Furthermore,
under the UCC, an offeror can propose a contract that limits the type of
conduct that constitutes an acceptance. 6 2 In this case, for example, the court
of appeals found that ProCD presented a contract that Zeidenberg could
accept by using the product after having an opportunity to review the proposed terms of the contract.'63 By using the product and by not returning it
within thirty days, Zeidenberg accepted the offer and was bound to its
terms.' Consequently, the terms of the software license agreement took
effect.' 65
The Seventh Circuit also observed that UCC Section 2-606166 allows
parties to structure their relations so that an acceptance is effective only after
the buyer receives the goods and has the opportunity to inspect and to reject
reasoning and analysis on this issue.
157. See id. at 1452 (observing that UCC permits contract formation in many ways).
158. See id. at 1451-52 (providing examples of transactions in which exchange of money
precedes communication of detailed terms of agreement).

159. See id. at 1450 (approving of district court's conclusion that contract includes only
terms on which parties agree and that one cannot assent to hidden terms).
160. See ict at 1452 ("So although the districtjudge was rightto say that a contract can be,
and often is, formed simply by paying the price and walking out of the store, the UCC permits
contracts to be formed in other ways.").
161. See id.(arguing that UCC does not restrict formation of contract to point of sale).

162. See id. (observing that vendor, as master of offer, can propose limits on manner of
acceptance). An offeree may accept the offer by performing the conduct that the offeror prescribed for acceptance. Id
163. See id. (stating that ProCD proposed contract that buyer was to accept by using
product after opportunity to consider terms).

164. See id. (asserting that Zeidenberg accepted contract by using software after having
opportunity to review terms).
165. See id. (determining that terms of software license agreement were effective against
Zeidenberg).

166. U.C.C. § 2-606 (1995). Section 2-606 provides:
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the goods. 67 The court first acknowledged that Section 2-606 deals with
acceptance of goods after delivery rather than acceptance of an offer. 6 The
court then stated that Section 2-606 nevertheless shows the UCC's flexibility
in allowing parties to provide an opportunity for 6the
buyer to inspect the
9
goods or the terms before making a final decision.
In analyzing the enforceability of the license agreement, the Seventh
Circuit emphasized that accept-or-return transactions provide a valuable
means of contracting. 70 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit citbd the comments
to Section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contractswhich indicate that
standardized agreements are essential to mass production and distribution. 7 '
Notably, the court cited the"Supreme Court's decision in CarnivalCruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute 72 in support of its contention regarding the practicality of
the use of these agreements.'73 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit in ProCD
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller that
the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of their
non-conformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Section 2-602), but such
acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity
to inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is
wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire
unit.
Id.
167. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (arguing that
Section 2-606 demonstrates that UCC allows parties to structure their dealings in manner that
permits buyer to inspect goods before making final decision).
168. See id. at 1453 (acknowledging that Section 2-606 relates to acceptance of goods after
delivery rather than acceptance of offer).
169. See id. (explaining that Section 2-606 demonstrates that "UCC consistently permits
the parties to structure their relations so that the buyer has a chance to make a final decision
after a detailed review").
170. See id. at 1451 ("Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the
software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable ... may be a means of doing business
valuable to buyers and sellers alike.").
171. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981)).
172. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
173. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Carnival
Cruise Lines). In Carnival Cruise Lines, the United States Supreme Court considered the
enforceability of a forum selection clause contained in a ticket that Carnival Cruise Lines issued
to a cruise line passenger. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587 (1991). The
Shutes filed suit against Carnival Cruise Lines in Washington for injuries that Eulala Shute
allegedly sustained because of the cruise line's negligence. Id. at 588. Carnival Cruise Lines
sought to enforce the forum selection clause that it had included in the Shute's cruise ticket to
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discussed the prevalence of transactions in which the exchange of money
occurs before the dispatch of terms. 74 The Seventh Circuit stated that the use
of accept-or-return offers, in addition to being more convenient for buyers and
sellers, benefits buyers because the use of these offers allows sellers to make
their goods available at a lower price. 7 5 Consequently,
the court enforced the
76
terms of the software license agreement.
B. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. gave the Seventh Circuit the opportunity to
revisit the subject of its ProCDopinion. Specifically, in Hill, the Seventh
Circuit emphasized that its liberal approach to contract formation in ProCD
did not apply only to shrinkwrap licenses. 77 Rather, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that its analysis applies to all accept-or-return offers
regardless of
78
the type of goods or the parties involved in the transaction.
require the Shutes to bring their suit in Florida. Id. The CarnivalCruiseLines Court observed
that courts presume forum selection clauses to be enforceable unless it would be unreasonable
to enforce the particular clause at issue. Id. at 591. Furthermore, the Court stated that the
Shutes had conceded that they had proper notice of the clause. Id. at 590. In considering the
reasonableness of enforcing the forum selection clause at issue, the Court recognized that it
would be unreasonable to assume that a cruise line passenger could negotiate the terms of a
cruise line ticket Id. at 593. Because the individual passengers could not negotiate the clause
with the cruise line, the Court refined its analysis of forum selection clauses to account for the
realities of form passage contracts. Id. After finding that the forum selection clause was reasonable in this case and that the Shutes had not satisfied the heavy burden of showing inconvenience, the CarnivalCruiseLines Court found that the lower court erred in refusing to enforce
the forum selection clause. Id. at 595.
174. See ProCD,86 F.3d at 1451-52 (providing examples of transactions in which party
does not learn of terms of agreement until after paying for goods). Judge Easterbrook observed
that insurance policies, airline tickets, and concert tickets are examples oftransactions in which
the purchaser pays for the goods before receiving all the terms of the agreement. Id. at 1451.
175. See id. at 1453 ("[A]djusting terms in buyers' favor might help Matthew Zeidenberg
today.., but would lead to a response, such as a higher price, that might make consumers as
a whole worse off."). The facts ofProCDmost likely motivated the Seventh Circuit's concern
that a failure to enforce an accept-or-return offer would lead to higher prices for consumers.
Specifically, ProCD engaged in price discrimination in marketing Select Phone: ProCD sold
the product to commercial entities at a higher price than it sold the product to consumers. Id.
at 1449. In order to make the price discrimination effective, ProCD limited the purchaser's use
of the product in the shrinkwrap license. Id. at 1450. The Seventh Circuit, therefore, appears
to have been concerned that if it found the shrinkwrap license to be unenforceable, ProCD
would be unable to offer its product to consumers at a lower price. Id. at 1453.
176. See id. at 1449, 1455 (discussing outcome of ProCD).
177. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.) ("ProCDis about the
law of contract, not the law of software."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
178. Id.
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As discussed in Part I, the Hills initiated a class action suit against Gateway after experiencing a series of problems with their Gateway computer
system.179 The Hills alleged breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment that the arbitration, disclaimer, and limited warranty clauses that Gateway
had shipped to the Hills with their computer system were unenforceable."' 0
Despite Gateway's request, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois refused to enforce the arbitration clause. 8 ' In its decision,
the district court found no valid arbitration agreement because Gateway failed
to give the Hills adequate notice ofthe arbitration clause.' Gateway appealed
the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit."18
Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the court, found that the ProCD
opinion controlled the outcome of Hill because both cases involved the
enforceability of accept-or-return transactions under the UCC.1 ' As in ProCD, the Seventh Circuit emphasized two themes in finding that the terms
which the seller shipped with the products bound the consumer purchaser of
goods.8 5 First, the Hill court stated that because of practical considerations,
vendors should be free to enclose the full legal terms governing the sale with
the product rather than having to disclose all terms before the exchange of
money. 8 6 Second, the court stressed that a vendor, as master of the offer, can
prescribe the conduct that constitutes acceptance and that the UCC permits
parties to form contracts in ways other than just at the point of sale.8 7
179. See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Hill).
180. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-C-4086, 1996 WL 650631, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 7, 1996) (discussing Hills' alleged grounds for suing Gateway), rev'd, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
181. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148 (stating that district court refused to enforce arbitration
clause).
182. See id. (explaining district court's rationale for refusing to enforce arbitration clause).
The district court did not transcribe its denial of Gateway's motion to compel arbitration in a
formal written opinion. The Seventh Circuit stated that "Gateway asked the district court to
enforce the arbitration clause; thejudge refused, writing that'[t]he present record is insufficient
to support a finding of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties or that the plaintiffs
were given adequate notice of the arbitration clause."' Id.
183. See id. (stating that Gateway appealed district court's refusal to enforce arbitration
clause).
184. See id. at 1149 (finding that ProCDanalysis applied to dispute because both cases
involved accept-or-return transactions that were subject to UCC).
185. See supranotes 157-58 and accompanying text (explaining two issues upon which
ProCDcourt focused).
186. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.) ("Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with their products."), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
187. See id.at 1148-49 (asserting that UCC permits parties to form contracts in many ways
and that offeror, as master of offer, can limit types of conduct that constitute acceptance).
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In discussing the pragmatic effects of accept-or-return offers, the Hill
court stressed, as the court had in ProCD,that in many transactions people
pay for products before receiving the terms of their agreement."' Moreover,
according to the Hill court, accept-or-return transactions benefit customers
because they eliminate costly and ineffective steps.'89 The Hill court also
observed the difficulties inherent in communicating the lengthy terms to the

buyer prior to the completion of the sale as support for the use of accept-or-

return offers. 9 '
The Hill court asserted that the crucial issue in ProCD involved the
formation of the contract and not the incorporation of particular terms into the
contract.' 9 ' In emphasizing that ProCDfocused on contract formation, the
Hill court rejected the Hills' attempts to distinguish ProCDand Hill. Specifically, the Hill court dismissed the Hills' contention that the shrinkwrap license
in ProCDwas an executory contract"9 and that, unlike the Hills, Zeidenberg
was a merchant. 93 In addition, the Hill court rebuffed the Hills' argument that
ProCD enforced the terms of the shrinkwrap license because the Select Phone
box included a reference to the enclosed license in small print on the outside
of the box. 94
' The Hill court rejected these attempts to distinguish ProCDby
188. See id. at 1149 (claiming that payment commonly precedes revelation of full terms
in commercial transactions).
189. See id. (arguing that practical considerations support use of accept-or-return transactions).
190. See id. (demonstrating difficulties involved in disclosing full terms to buyer prior to
completion of sale in certain situations). In support of the use of accept-or-return transactions,
Judge Easterbrook noted the practical consideration that one cannot expect either cashiers in
face-to-face transactions or staff in telephone order sales to read the full legal terms of the
agreement to the customer before completing the sale. Id.
191. See id. at 1150 (explaining nature of issue in ProCD and Hill). The Hill court
summarized the ProCD decision stating:
The question in ProCDwas not whether terms were added to a contract after its
formation, but how and when the contract was formed - in particular, whether a
vendor may propose that a contract of sale be formed, not in the store (or over the
phone) with the payment of money or a general "send me the product," but after the
customer has had a chance to inspect both the item and the terms.
Id.
192. Id at 1149. The Hill court also found that in addition to being legally wrong, the
Hills' argument was factually incorrect because both the contract in Hill and the contract in
ProCDwere executory. Id.
193. See id.(rejecting Hills' attempts to distinguish ProCD).The Hills argued thatProCD
was not applicable to the dispute because the buyer in ProCD,unlike the Hills, was a merchant.
Id. Because of this distinction, the Hills claimed that Section 2-207(2) compelled a different
result for the two cases. Id. The Hill court, however, rejected both the Hills' attempt to invoke
Section 2-207 and their characterization of the buyer in ProCD.Id.; see infranotes 227-42 and
accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Section 2-207).
194. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.) (finding that absence
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maintaining that, because ProCDinvolved the formation of the contract, the
prior case was applicable to the Hill case. 95 As a result, the Hill court remanded the case to the district court and instructed the district court to compel
the Hills to arbitrate their claims against Gateway.196
C. Critique of the Seventh Circuit'sApproach to ContractFormation
1. Seventh Circuit'sApproach Misapplies andMisinterprets
the Uniform CommercialCode

The Seventh Circuit's approach to contract formation in Hill misapplies
and misinterprets the UCC. First, the Hill court misapplied Sections 2-204
and 2-206 to the facts of the dispute and, therefore, ignored the agreement that
the parties reached when the Hills ordered the computer from Gateway. 9 7
Second, as a result of its misunderstanding of the scope of Section 2-207,19
the Seventh Circuit refused to give proper consideration to the effect of the
divergent terms that Gateway included with the products.' 99
a. Sections 2-204 and 2-206
i. Section 2-204
In Hill, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the flexibility of the UCC ap-

proach to contract formation." ° Specifically, the Seventh Circuit stated that
Section 2-204 allows parties to form a contract in any manner that is sufficient
to show agreement. 20 ' Although the Seventh Circuit correctly noted that

of notice on Gateway computer box did not distinguish Hill from ProCD),cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 47 (1997).
195. See id. at 1149-50 (rejecting Hills' attempts to distinguish ProCD).
196. See id. at 1151 (discussing outcome of Hil).
197. See infranotes200-26 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's misapplication of Sections 2-204 and 2-206 in Hil).
198. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (arguing that Section 2-207 is irrelevant to disputes that
involve only one form (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996))).
Because the Hill court found that the parties did not form their contract until after the Hills had
the opportunity to inspect and to reject the terms, the court did not determine whether additional
terms became part of the contract. Id. However, if one accepts the argument that the parties
formed their contract at the time of sale, the application of Section 2-207 becomes crucial to
determining the terms of the contract. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d
91, 104 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that terms of box-top license did not become part of contract
under Section 2-207).
199. See infranotes 227-42 and accompanying text (arguing that Seventh Circuit misinterpreted Section 2-207 in Hil).
200. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7thCir.) (arguing thatUCC
permits parties to form contracts in many different ways (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-52)),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).

201. See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1995) (providing that parties may form contract in any manner
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Section 2-204 reflects the UCC's liberal contract formation provisions, 2 the
court misapplied the section to the facts in Hill. In particular, rather than help
identify the parties' bargain-in-fact, 2 3 the Seventh Circuit's analysis frustrated
the parties' reasonable expectations.
First, the Seventh Circuit ignored the apparent agreement 4 that existed
between the Hills and Gateway when the Hills ordered the computer from
Gateway. 5 According to traditional contract analysis, parties form a contract
at the time of sale. 0 6 Typically, courts have found that the seller offers to sell
a product by placing the product on a shelf in a retail store or by including the
product in a catalogue.2 7 Because paying for the goods is a reasonable means
of accepting the offer, the parties form their contract at the time of sale.20 '
The Seventh Circuit did not adequately explain in Hillhow it reached the
conclusion that the parties did not form a contract when the Hills ordered the
computer from Gateway. First, the facts did not indicate that the Hills knew
at the time of the sale that Gateway would ship additional terms with the
product or that Gateway intended the parties to form their contract only after
the buyer had the opportunity to review the additional terms.0 9 Had the seller
sufficient to show agreement); supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text (discussing Section
2-204).
202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (stating that Hill court emphasized that
UCC permits parties to form contracts in many ways).
203. See Murray, supra note 38, at 7 (arguing that purpose ofArticle 2 is fair identification
of parties' bargain-in-fact).
204. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1995) (defining agreement as "bargain of the parties in fact
as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance").
205. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (concluding thatHills accepted Gateway's offerby keeping
computer beyond 30 days and that parties did not form contract at point of sale).
206. See Kell Corrigan Mercer, Case Note, Consumer Shrink-WrapLicenses andPublic
DomainMaterials;CopyrightPreemption and Uniform CommercialCode Validity in ProCD
v. Zeidenberg, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1287, 1338 (1997) (arguing that Seventh Circuit's
analysis in ProCD"ignores established contract precedent which views a sale as a contract"
(citing Barry v. Barry, 78 F.3d 375,382 (8th Cir. 1996); In re Wood, 47 B.R. 774,778 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1985); Cross-Abbott Co. v. Howard's, Inc., 207 A.2d 134, 138 (Vt. 1965))); see also
Step-SaverData Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 100 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that buyer
and seller formed contract at point of sale).
207. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp 640, 651-52 (W.D. Wis.) (finding that
ProCD offered to sell Select Phone by placing product on shelf in store), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996).
208. See id. at 652 (determining that Zeidenberg accepted ProCD's offer by paying for
product); Mercer, supra note 206, at 1338-40 (contending that parties in ProCD formed
contract at point of sale).
209. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-C-4086, 1996 WL 650631, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (stating that Hills had no notice of Agreement or Warranty until after Hills purchased
computer system), rev'd, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); see also
ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 654 (stating that Zeidenberg did not have opportunity to inspect or to
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made the buyer aware that the contract would not be complete until after
delivery, the Seventh Circuit's analysis would have been correct.21 However,
because the buyer did not know of the additional terms or that the formation
of the contract was subject to the buyer having the opportunity to inspect and
to reject the terms or the goods, the buyer would have reasonably expected the
purchase of the goods to complete the formation of the contract.2
Furthermore, the parties' objective manifestations when the Hills ordered
the computer indicated the existence of a binding agreement. According to
traditional contract law, only the intentions that a party objectively manifests
can bind the other party.21 2 Gateway indicated in its advertising to potential
buyers that the only act necessary to complete the formation of a sales contract was to call Gateway and order a computer. 3 Moreover, Gateway did
not objectively manifest at the time of sale that it did not intend for the terms
of the sales contract to bind the parties until after the buyer had the opportunity to inspect and to reject the terms. Rather, Gateway only communicated
that intent when it shipped the computer system to the Hills with the list of
terms. 4 Because Gateway failed to manifest objectively to the Hills that it
consider terms of shrinkwrap license before purchasing software). Because the Hills did not
have notice of the terms of the Agreement, they also did not have notice of the clause that
required them to return the product within a specified amount of time if they did not agree to
the terms of the agreement. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148 (explaining that clause requiring Hills
to return computer within 30 days ifthey objected to terms of Agreement was part ofterms that
Gateway shipped with computer).
210. See Beard Implement Co., Inc. v. Krusa, 567 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Iii. App. Ct. 1991)
(construing Section 2-206(1) as preserving common-law rule that offeror can prescribe manner
of acceptance); supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (arguing that Section 2-206 preserves
common-law rule that offeror is master of offer).
211. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 652 (stating that parties would not reasonably expect
formation of contract to require further action after time of sale); see also Pitet,supra note 110,
at 342 (contending that vendor in ProCD did not clearly demonstrate its intent to prevent
contract formation at point of sale).
212. See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract
has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties."); see
also Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1122 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding
that one party's secretly harbored intent did not bind other party); Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt
Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1576 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating that contract requires objective manifestations of mutual assent); Jo-Ann, Inc. v. Alfin Fragrances, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 149, 155 (D.N.J.
1989) (applying objective theory of mutual assent); Computer Network, Ltd. v. Purcell Tire &
Rubber Co., 747 S.W.2d 669, 674-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that contracting parties must
objectively manifest their assent to be bound to agreement).
213. See Hill, 1996 WL 650631, at *1 (describing Gateway's method of advertising its
computer system). The district court stated that Gateway "offered" the computer system by
advertising in media directed at computer buyers. Id.
214. See id. at *2 (stating that Gateway sent additional terms to Hills in computer system's
shipping box).
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did not intend to form a contract at the time of sale, the parties' conduct at the
time of sale created a binding agreement.1 5
In a comparable case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found that contracting parties formed their binding agreement at the
time of sale rather than after the buyer received and had the opportunity to
inspect the goods. 1 6 In Step-SaverDataSystems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology,217
the court determined that the parties formed their contract at the point of sale
despite a clause that the seller included in the product's box-top license 8 that
required the buyer to return the product within fifteen days ifthe buyer did not
agree to the terms of the license.219 In particular, the Step-Saver court found
that the parties' agreement at the point of sale was sufficiently definite to
constitute a contract: the parties had determined the specific goods involved,
the quantity, and the price."
The Hills and Gateway, like the parties in Step-Saver,had determined the
specific goods involved, the quantity, and the price when the Hills ordered the
computer from Gateway." Furthermore, as discussed above, the parties'
objective manifestations indicated that they intended to enter into a binding
agreement at the point of sale.' For these reasons, the Hill court erred in
ignoring the apparent agreement that the Hills and Gateway had reached at the
point of sale.
ii. Section 2-206
A second problem with the Hill court's contention that the parties did not
form their contract until after the buyer had the opportunity to inspect and to
reject the product is thatthe Seventh Circuit misconstrued the offeror's power
to condition the manner of acceptance under the UCC.' As discussed in Part
II, under Section 2-206, the offeree can accept an offer by any means reason215. See supranote 44 (listing cases which explain that courts apply objective standard in
determining whether parties intend to contract).
216. See Step-SaverDataSys., Inc. v. WyseTech., 939 F.2d. 91,100 (3d Cir. 1991) (determining that contract which parties formed was sufficiently definite contract at point of sale).
217. See supra note 147 (discussing Step-Saver).
218. See supranote 136 (stating that box-top license is type of shrinkwrap license).
219. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 96-97 (describing box-top license).
220. See id.at 100 (determining that agreement met standards of Section 2-204(3)).
221. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-C-4086, 1996 WL 650631, at *1 (N.D. Ill.

1996) (stating that "the Hills purchased a 10th Anniversary System from Gateway for $4,009
plus tax and shipping"), rev'd, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
222. See supra notes 200-22 and accompanying text (arguing that Gateway and Hills
objectively expressed intent to enter into binding agreement at time of sale).
223.

See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (discussing offeror's power to condi-

tion manner of acceptance under Section 2-206).
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able under the circumstances unless the offeror unambiguouslyprescribes the
appropriate time, place, and manner of acceptance. 4 In Hill,Gateway did not
indicate unambiguously to the Hills at the time of sale that the appropriate
manner of acceptance would be to keep the product after having the opportunity to review the terms.' Because the seller did not unambiguously condition that the appropriate manner of acceptance would be a failure to return the
product after having the opportunity to inspect the terms of the agreement, the
buyer was free to accept the seller's offer by purchasing the goods. 6
b. Section 2-207
The above analysis demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit misapplied
Sections 2-204 and 2-206 by refusing to construe the time of sale as the
formation of the contract. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit erred in its
interpretation of Section 2-207. The Hill court erroneously asserted that
Section 2-207 was not relevant to the dispute because Section 2-207 does not
apply in cases involving only one form." This argument misinterprets Section 2-207 in two ways. First, neither the UCC text nor the Official Comments limit Section 2-207's applicability to transactions involving more than
one form." Second, limiting the applicability of Section 2-207 to cases
involving more than one form is contrary to the policies underlying the
section.229
First, neither the text of Section 2-207 nor its Official Comments explicitly require both parties to submit a form in order for the section to apply.uo
224. See Beard Implement Co., Inc. v. Krusa, 567 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(illustrating that Section 2-206 requires offeror to state any requirement for manner of acceptance unambiguously).
225. See Hill, 1996 WL 650631, at *2 (illustrating that Hills received terms of agreement
with computer system rather than at point of sale).
226. See supranotes 59-63 and accompanying text (explaining that offeree can accept offer
in any manner reasonable under circumstances if offeror does not unambiguously prescribe
proper manner of acceptance).
227. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.) (stating that Section
2-207 does not apply in cases involving only one form (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996))), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); see alsoProCD,86 F.3d
at 1452 (arguing that Section 2-207 and Step-Saver are irrelevant to disputes involving only one
form).
228. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text (arguing that text of Section 2-207
does not limit applicability of section to disputes involving more than one form).
229. See infranotes235-37 and accompanying text (contending that limiting Section 2-207
to cases involving multiple forms frustrates policies underlying that section).
230. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995) (determining effect of additional or different terms in
acceptance or written confirmation); supra notes 67-107 and accompanying text (discussing
Section 2-207).
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Rather, the comments explain that Section 2-207 applies in two situations.
Section 2-207 applies when the parties have reached an oral agreement and
one or both parties send a form embodying the discussed terms along with the
newly added terms."' Also, if the purported acceptance to an offer contains
additional or different terms, Section 2-207 is the operable provision 3 2 Thus,
neither the plain language of Section 2-207 nor the Official Comments to the
section support the Hill court's contention that the section is irrelevant in

cases involving only one form.
Furthermore, although most commentators emphasize that Section 2-207
applies in the context of the battle of forms, they have not limited their analyses of Section 2-207 to disputes involving multiple forms."I Rather, many
commentators have stressed that Section 2-207 applies to any contract for the
sale of goods in which the terms of the acceptance or written confirmation
vary from the terms of the offer or the oral agreement.3 4 In sum, the Seventh
Circuit's conclusion that Section 2-207 is irrelevant in a case involving only
231. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (1995) (describing situations in which drafters intended
Section 2-207 to apply). Official Comment 1 states:
1. This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is the
written confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or by
informal correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the
parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and
adding terms not discussed. The other situation is offer and acceptance, in which
a wire or letter expressed and intended as an acceptance or the closing of an
agreement adds further minor suggestions or proposals ....
Id.
232. See id.(describing situations in which drafters intended Section 2-207 to apply).
233. See Meiklejohn, supra note 67, at 605 n.28 ("Nothing in § 2-207's text limits its
coverageto transactions involving form documents."); Mercer, supranote 206, at 1341 (stating
that ProCDcourt erred in limiting application of Section 2-207 to cases involving two or more
forms); Mark A. French, Recent Development, 12 OIo ST. J. ONDISP. RESOL. 811, 816 (1997)
(characterizing Seventh Circuit's contention that Section 2-207 applies only to situation in which
two forms are exchanged as misunderstanding); see also I WHrrE & SUMMERS, supranote 62,
§ 1-3, at 9 (listing eight situations to which Section 2-207 applies). White and Summers do not
limit their list of applicable situations to those involving the use of multiple forms. Id.
234. See 3 DUEsENBERO & KiNG, supra note 44, § 3.03, at 3-12 to 3-13 (stating that
Section 2-207 "deals with all contracts for the sale of goods" and "is not limited to contracts
entered into through the exchange of printed forms" but "is a section applicable across the board
to all sales contracts wherein the responsive document to an offer varies the exact terms of the
offer"); see also I HAWKLAND, supranote 43, § 2-207:1, at 262 ("The section, however, is not
limited to situations where forms have been used, though most commonly that is where it will
come into operation."). Butsee Brown, supra note 36, at 899 ("Although the drafters failed to
make explicit their intention to limit section 2-207's innovations to agreements in which at least
one party's preprinted form plays a role, such a limitation is generally understood and makes
good sense."); id. at n.23 (discussing rationale for requiring at least one form for application of
Section 2-207).
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one form not only lacks support in the language of Section 2-207 and the
Official Comments, but it lacks support from commentators as well.
Second, limiting the scope of Section 2-207 to transactions involving
multiple forms frustrates the policies underlying the UCC and, more specifically, the policies of Section 2-207. The drafters of the UCC intended
Article 2 to identify the parties' bargain-in-fact. 2 5 Section 2-207, in particular, protects the factual bargain of the parties by recognizing the existence of
an enforceable contract despite the insertion of additional or different terms
in an acceptance or a written confirmation."s Although an acceptance or a
confirmation that includes a different or an additional term is likely to appear
in a battle-of-forms case, divergent acceptances and confirmations are not
limited to that context. By refusing to recognize that Section 2-207 addresses
concerns that extend beyond the classic battle-of-forms case, the Seventh
Circuit frustrates the policies underlying the section."
Rather than summarily dismissing the buyer's Section 2-207 argument,
the Seventh Circuit in ProCDand Hill should have analyzed the documents
that the sellers included with the products as written confirmations of oral
agreements that included different or additional terms. 8 The panels should
have characterized the documents as confirmations because, under Section
2-204, the parties in both cases formed their contracts at the point of sale. 9
Applying this analysis to Hill, one finds that because the parties had formed
the contract before the Hills received the computer system, the documents
included with the goods would be a written confirmation of the prior agreement under Section 2-207(l).24 As a result, because the confirmation added
235. See Murray, supra note 29, at 1311 (stating that underlying policy of Article 2 is
precise and fair identification of parties' factual bargain); supranotes 38-41 and accompanying
text (discussing policies of Article 2).
236. See U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1995) (allowing acceptance or written confirmation that
contains additional or different terms from offer to operate as acceptance); Album Graphics, Inc.
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1047 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (explaining that purpose of
Section 2-207 is to allow parties to enforce their agreements despite discrepancies between offer
and acceptance or between oral agreement and written confirmation).
237. See generally Murray,supra note 38 (emphasizing importance ofinterpreting Article
2 consistently with its underlying policies).
238. See French, supra note 233, at 816 (asserting that terms that Gateway sent with
computer system were part of written confirmation of oral agreement); Mercer, supranote 206,
at 1342-43 (arguing that ProCDcourt should have analyzed software license agreement as
written confirmation of parties' agreement); see also supranotes 77-79 and accompanying text
(discussing written confirmations under Section 2-207).
239. See supra notes 200-22 and accompanying text (arguing that Hills and Gateway
formed their contract at point of sale).
240. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 100 (3d Cir. 1991)
(analyzing box-top license that seller sent with product as written confirmation); Transamerica
Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 765 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding that invoice that seller sent
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terms to the prior agreement, the terms would be proposals for modification
under Section 2-207(2).24 Finally, because the transaction was between a
merchant and a consumer, the terms would become
part of the contract only
242
if the buyer expressly assented to the terms.
2. Seventh Circuit'sApproach Favorsthe Seller
A second problem with the Seventh Circuit's approach to contract
formation in Hill is that the approach is inconsistent with the UCC's emphasis
on neutrality. Several courts have observed that the drafters of the UCC
intended Article 2 to promote neutrality and to abandon common-law principles that unduly favored one party.24 In Hill, however, the Seventh Circuit
adopted an approach that, similar to the problematic common law last-shot
doctrine, favors the seller of goods. 2' Specifically, the Seventh Circuit's
approach allows the seller to impose additional terms on the buyer after the
buyer has agreed to purchase the goods, so long as the seller includes a
statement that the buyer must return the goods if it disagrees with the altered
terms.24 The buyer, therefore, is left with the options of either abandoning
the transaction completely by returning the goods or accepting the seller's
terms.246 Furthermore, because some businessmen and consumers might not
read the terms on the back of standardized forms and, thus, would not even
know of their option to return the goods, the Seventh Circuit's approach

results in the seller's unilateral imposition of terms onto the buyer.
with goods qualified as acceptance or written confirmation under Section 2-207); Sudenga
Indus., Inc. v. Fulton Performance Prods., 894 F. Supp. 1235, 1236-38 (N.D. Iowa 1995)
(determining that invoices that seller issued contemporaneously with shipment of goods were
written confirmations under Section 2-207); Herzog Oil Field Serv., Inc. v. Otto Torpedo Co.,
570 A.2d 549, 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (construing invoice that seller sent after delivery of
goods as written confirmation).
241. See supranotes 96-97 and accompanying text (explaining application of Section 2207(2) when written confirmation includes additional or different terms).
242. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that in transaction between
merchant and consumer, terms become part of contract only if consumer expressly assents).
243. See Diamond FruitGrowers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440,1444 (9th Cir. 1986)
(stating that neutrality is one policy underlying Section 2-207); Leonard Pevar Co. v. Evans
Prods. Co., 524 F. Supp. 546, 551 (D. Del. 1981) ("The Code disfavors any attempt by one
party to impose unilaterally conditions that would create hardship on another party.").
244. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing common law last-shot
doctrine).
245. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.) (enforcing terms that
Gateway sent with computer system because Hills kept computer for more than 30 days), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
246. See French, supra note 233, at 820 (asserting that Seventh Circuit's approach to
contract formation leaves consumers with choice of "accepting the terms of the contract completely at their own peril, or wholly rejecting the contract and abandoning the transaction").
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The decision not to enforce the terms of an accept-or-return offer, however, creates the practical problems that Judge Easterbrook emphasized in
Hill.47 For example, Judge Easterbrook correctly observed that one cannot
expect cashiers and telephone sales staff to read the full legal terms of a
contract to a buyer before completing the sale.248 Similarly, the United States
Supreme Court, in CarnivalCruiseLines, Inc. v. Shute, 49recognized the practical difficulties that have contributed to the increased use of form contracts. 25
In CarnivalCruiseLines, the Court enforced a forum selection clause that the
cruise line had enclosed in terms that it sent to the cruise passenger with the
passenger's ticket." In determining that the forum selection clause was
enforceable, the Court emphasized that it was unreasonable to assume that
cruise passengers would be able to negotiate the terms of the contract with the
cruise line. 2 Both the practical considerations that Judge Easterbrook
outlined in Hill and the Supreme Court's opinion in CarnivalCruise Lines,
therefore, reveal that the proper approach to accept-or-return offers should
protect the buyer from unilateral impositions of terms by the seller while still
allowing the seller to conduct its business effectively. 3
3. Seventh Circuit'sApproachResults in Unfair Surprise to the Buyer
In Hill, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Hills' argument that they did not
have sufficient notice of the arbitration clause. 4 The Hill court stated that
buyers can learn of additional terms in three ways. 5 First, they can ask the
vendor to send a copy of any terms governing the sale before they purchase
the product. 6 Second, they can consult public sources such as magazines or
247. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 ("Practical considerations support allowing vendors to
enclose the full legal terms with their products.").
248. See id. (stating that if sales staff tried to read full legal terms to buyers before completing sale, "the droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers").
249.

See supra note 173 (discussing CarnivalCruise Lines).

250. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,593 (1991) (recognizing that
cruise passengers cannot negotiate terms of their commercial cruise tickets).
251. See id. at 595 (concluding that forum selection clause was enforceable).
252. See id. at 593 (discussing practical considerations). The Court stated that"[c]ommon
sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of which are not subject
to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining parity with
the cruise line." Id.
253. See Baker, supra note 110, at 409-18 (discussing important practical benefits of
shrinkwrap licenses).
254. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.) (rejecting Hills'
argument that terms shipped with computer system were unenforceable because Hills lacked
notice of terms), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
255. See id. (listing ways in which buyer can learn of additional terms of agreement).
256. See id. (stating that buyer can request copy of terms prior to purchasing product).
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the vendor's World Wide Web site." 7 Finally, they can inspect the terms after
they receive the product from the vendor." The Hill court, therefore, placed
on the buyer both the burden of discovering the terms and the cost of avoiding
the terms if the buyer finds them undesirable. 9
The Seventh Circuit's apparent willingness to place the burden ofdiscovering unfair terms on the buyer is problematic. First, by placing the burden
on the buyer, the court relieves the seller of any responsibility for alerting
potential buyers to the terms of its sales.26 However, because the seller is
clearly in a position to include this information in its advertising or on its
products' labels, placing the burden of discovering the terms on the buyer is
unreasonable.2 6' Second, requiring the buyer to discover any unfair terms
places the buyer in a disadvantageous position by subjecting the buyer to the
unfair surprise of additional or different terms.
IV ProposedRevisions to Article 2
The foregoing analysis reveals that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hill
is problematic because of its interpretation of the UCC and because it favors
the seller and enforces terms that unfairly surprise the buyer. This Part examines the current efforts by the A.L.I. and the N.C.C.U.S.L. to revise Article 2
of the UCC. Specifically, this Part considers whether recent drafting efforts
solve the problems that accept-or-return offers create.
257. See id. (explaining that buyer can discover terms of contract by consulting public
sources).
258. See id. (noting that buyer can inspect terms of contract after receiving product and
terms).
259. See French, supra note 233, at 817 (stating that Hill court placed burden of discovering terms of contract on buyer).
260. See Jean R. Stemlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding
Arbitration on Consumers,FLA. B.J., Nov. 1997, at 8, 12 (stating that court's decision in Hill
shifts costs of discovering additional terms to consumers).
261. See id.at 12 (arguing that requiring vendor to notify buyer of important additional
terms is not unreasonable). Professor Sternlight proposed several ways that Gateway could have
notified buyers of its arbitration clause:
Gateway might have easily [alerted its customers to the existence of the arbitration
clause] in any number of ways: by noting the existence of the arbitration clause in
its advertisements where it already mentioned the limited warranty; by requiring its
cashiers to mention the arbitration clause and then offering to read it or send it upon
the customer's request; or by at least including mention ofthe clause on the written
confirmation that the company sent to its customers prior to shipment of the
computer.
IdM(footnote omitted); see Pitet, supranote 110, at 347-51 (proposing that courts require vendor
to provide notice to buyer that parties do not form contract at point of sale, to give notice to
buyer of existence of additional terms, and to allow buyer opportunity to review terms prior to
purchase).
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A. May 1998 Draft
1. ProposedSections 2-204 and2-206

Proposed Sections 2-204262 and 2-206263 govern contract formation issues
in the proposed revisions to Article 2.2" Similar to their counterparts in the
current UCC,2 65 the proposed contract formation provisions eliminate the
constraints of the traditional common-law rules of offer and acceptance.266 In
262. U.C.C. § 2-204 (Discussion Draft May 1998). Proposed Section 2-204 states:
(a) A contract may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including
by offer and acceptance and conduct of both parties which recognizes the existence
of a contract.
(b) If the parties so intend, an agreement sufficient to constitute a contract may be
found even if the time of its making is undetermined, one or more terms are left
open or to be agreed upon, the records of the parties do not otherwise establish a
contract, or one party reserves the right to modify terms.
(c) Even if one or more terms are left open, a contract does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis
for an appropriate remedy.
(d) Conspicuous language in a record which expressly conditions the intention of
the proposing party to contract upon agreement by the other party to terms proposed in the record prevents contract formation unless the required agreement is
given.
Id.
263. Id. § 2-206 (Discussion Draft May 1998). Proposed Section 2-206 states:
(a) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances:
(1) An offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any
manner and by any medium reasonable under the circumstances. Subject to Section 2-204(d), a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an
acceptance even though it contains terms that vary the offer.
(2) An order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be
construed to invite acceptance by either a prompt promise to ship or a prompt or
current shipment of conforming goods. If under the circumstances the order or
offer is construed to invite acceptance by the shipment of non-conforming goods,
the non-conforming shipment is not an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies
the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation.
(b) Ifthe beginning ofarequested performance is a reasonable mode ofacceptance,
an offeror that is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the
contract as discharged.
Id.
264. U.C.C. § 2-203 note I (Discussion Draft July 1997) (stating that Sections 2-203 and
2-205 (proposed Sections 2-204 and 2-206 in May 1998 draft) control issues of contract

formation).
265. See supra notes 38-66 and accompanying text (discussing current UCC's contract
formation provisions, Sections 2-204 and 2-206).
266. See Ostas & Darr, supra note 34, at 418 (stating that contract formation provisions
of 1993 discussion draft remove constraints of common law).
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particular, these provisions recognize the parties' contract so long as the
parties have intended to contract.267
Proposed Section 2-204 provides the general principles of contract formation.268 The majority of proposed Section 2-204 is simply a restatement of
current Section 2-204.269 The most important difference between proposed
Section 2-204 and its counterpart in the current UCC is the integration of cur-

rent Section 2-207's contract formation concepts with the general principles

of formation.27 Specifically, proposed Section 2-204(b) allows parties to
form a contract even though their records27 do not otherwise establish a
contract.272 Thus, proposed Section 2-204(b) incorporates the general rule of
current Section 2-207(1) that the inclusion of terms in an acceptance that vary
from the offer does not preclude the formation of a contract.273
Proposed Section 2-206 provides the specific rules for the acceptance of
a contract.274 In essence, proposed Section 2-206 continues the general rules
that current Section 2-206 embodies.27 The proposed section's most impor267. See U.C.C. § 2-204(a)-(c) (Discussion Draft May 1998) (recognizing agreement that
fails common-law rules of contract formation as enforceable if parties intended to contract).
268. See id § 2-204(a)-(c) (Discussion Draft May 1998) (providing proposed UCC's general contract formation principles).
269. CompareU.C.C. § 2-204 (1995) (providing currentUCC'sgeneral contractformation
principles) with U.C.C. § 2-204 (Discussion Draft May 1998) (providing proposed UCC's
general contract formation principles). Both provisions allow contracting parties to form their
contract (1) in any manner sufficient to show agreement, (2) even though the moment of the
contract's formation is indeterminable, and (3) despite their failure to agree upon all the terms
of their contract. U.C.C. § 2-204(l)-(3) (1995); U.C.C. § 2-204(a)-(c) (Discussion Draft May
1998). Furthermore, under both provisions, the applicable test for determining whether a
contract is sufficiently definite is whether the parties intended to contract and whether a
reasonably certain basis for remedying a breach of that contract exists. U.C.C. § 2-204(3)
(1995); U.C.C. § 2-204(c) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
270. See supranotes 77-94 and accompanying text (discussing contract formation under
Section 2-207).
271. See U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(26) (Discussion DraftMay 1998) (defining record as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium, or that is stored in an electronic or other medium
and is retrievable in perceivable form").
272. See id. § 2-204(b) (Discussion Draft May 1998) (stating that parties may form contract even though records do not establish contract).
273. See id. (integrating contract formation rules of current Sections 2-204 and 2-207).
274. See id. § 2-206 (Discussion Draft May 1998) (providing proposed UCC's specific
rules for acceptance of contract).
275. CompareU.C.C. § 2-206 (1995) (providing current UCC's specific rules for acceptances) with U.C.C. § 2-206 (Discussion Draft May 1998) (providing proposed UCC's specific
rules for acceptances). Both sections provide specific rules for acceptances that apply unless
the language or circumstances unambiguously indicate otherwise. U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (1995);
U.C.C. § 2-206(a) (Discussion Draft May 1998). These rules allow a party to accept an offer
in any manner or by any means reasonable under the circumstances. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a)
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tant deviation from the current section is that the proposed section explicitly
states that a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance which contains
terms that vary from the offer is a valid acceptance. 6 This provision, therefore, incorporates the contract formation principles ofcurrent Section 2-207(1)
into the specific rules of acceptance.277
Proposed Sections 2-204(b) and 2-206(a)(1) avoid the Seventh Circuit's
analysis of current Section 2-207 in Hill.2 71 Specifically, the proposed revisions separate issues of contract formation from problems of determining
which terms become part of the contract.27 9 In particular, proposed Sections
2-204(b) and 2-206(a)(1) provide that neither the failure of the records to
establish a contract2 0° nor the inclusion of varying terms in an acceptance"1
precludes the formation of a contract. Because the proposed revisions include
these provisions as part of the general principles of contract formation, courts
should not limit their application to disputes involving multiple forms. Hence,
in comparison to the Seventh Circuit's faulty interpretation of current Section
2-207, the structural change of the proposed revisions prevents courts from
limiting their application to multiple form disputes.
However, proposed Sections 2-204 and 2-206 do not alter the heart ofthe
Seventh Circuit's ruling in Hill. Essentially, the focal point of Hill is the
court's decision that the parties did not form a contract at the point of sale, but
rather that they formed a contract only after the buyer had the opportunity to
(1995); U.C.C. § 2-206(a)(1) (Discussion Draft May 1998). Furthermore, the sections construe
an offer to purchase goods as authorizing acceptance by either a prompt promise to ship or a
prompt shipment ofthe goods. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (1995); U.C.C. § 2-206(a)(2) (Discussion
Draft May 1998). Additionally, if beginning performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance,
both sections state that an offeror may treat the offer as having lapsed if he does not receive
notice of acceptance within a reasonable time. U.C.C. § 2-206(2) (1995); U.C.C. § 2-206(b)
(Discussion Draft May 1998). The only difference between the two provisions is that the shipment of nonconforming goods is not an acceptance under the proposed provision if the offer is
construed to permit acceptance by the shipment of nonconforming goods and the offeree notifies
the offeror that the goods are offered as an accommodation. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (1995);
U.C.C. § 2-206(a)(2) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
276. U.C.C. § 2-206(a)(1) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
277. Id. Although the proposed section does not define a definite expression ofacceptance,
the drafters' notes to the July 1997 discussion draft state that an acceptance that contains varying
terms from the offer will likely be a definite acceptance only if the varying terms are in the
boilerplate. See U.C.C. § 2-205 note 1 (Discussion Draft July 1997) (explaining that varying
terms will likely not preclude formation of contract if varying terms are in boilerplate language).
278. See supra notes 227-42 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of Section 2-207).
279. See U.C.C. § 2-204 note 2 (Discussion Draft May 1998) (stating that revisions
separate issues of contract formation from issues of what terms become part of contract).
280. Id. § 2-204(b) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
281. Id. § 2-206(a)(1) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
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inspect and to reject the goods.282 Because proposed Sections 2-204 and
2-206 essentially replicate current Sections 2-204 and 2-206, these sections
do not prevent courts from enforcing an accept-or-return offer.283 Rather,
these proposed sections are vulnerable to the Hill court's analysis. Therefore,
they do not present a sufficient solution to the problem of the inherent bias
and the unfair surprise associated with accept-or-return offers.
2. ProposedSection 2-207
Proposed Section 2-207.84 provides the analysis for determining the
terms of the parties' contract.285 This section, therefore, applies only if the
parties have formed a contract under proposed Sections 2-204 and 2-206.286
282. See supranotes 200-22 and accompanying text (examining Seventh Circuit's finding
that parties did not form contract at time of sale).
283. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (explaining that majority of proposed Section 2-204 is restatement of current Section 2-204); supranotes 274-75 and accompanying text
(stating that proposed Section 2-206 continues general rules that current Section 2-206 embodies).
284. U.C.C. § 2-207 (Discussion Draft May 1998). Proposed Section 2-207 states:
(a) This section is subject to Sections 2-202 and 2-105.
(b) Ifa contract is formed by offer and acceptance and the acceptance is by a record
containing terms varying from the offer or by conduct of the parties that recognizes
the existence of a contract but the records of the parties do not otherwise establish
a contract for sale, the contract includes:
(1) terms in the records of the parties to the extent that the records agree;
(2) terms not in records to which the parties have otherwise agreed;
(3) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of this [Act]; and
(4) terms in a [form] record supplied by a party to which the other party has
expressly agreed.
(c) If a contract is formed by any manner permitted under this article and either
party or both parties confirms the agreement by a record, the contract includes:
(1) terms agreed to prior to the confirmation;
(2) terms in a confirming record that do not materially vary the prior agreement and
are not seasonably objected to;
(3) terms in confirming records to the extent that they agree; and
(4) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of this [Act].
Id.
285. See id. (supplying analysis for determining whether varying terms become part of
contract). Prior discussion drafts included a specific provision for determining whether
nonnegotiated terms become part of a consumer contract in which the consumer has agreed to
a record. See U.C.C. § 2-206 (Discussion Draft March 1998) (providing analysis for determining whether nonnegotiated terms are part of consumer contract). The drafting committee has
bracketed proposed Section 2-206 of the March 1998 draft for further discussion. See U.C.C.
§ 2-105 note 2 (Discussion Draft May 1998).
286. See U.C.C. § 2-207 note 1 (Discussion Draft May 1998) (explaining that Section 2207 determines terms of contract formed under other sections of Article 2).
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As a result, the counterpart for this provision in the current UCC is Section
2.207.87
Proposed Section 2-207 applies in two situations. First, it applies if the
parties form their contract by an offer and an acceptance or by their conduct
and (1) the terms of the acceptance vary from the terms of the offer or (2) both
the offer and the acceptance are in records. 288 Second, it applies if the parties
289
reach an agreement and one party sends a record to confirm the agreement.
Under proposed Section 2-207, the terms of a contract that the parties form by
offer and acceptance or by conduct are the terms upon which the parties'
records agree, the terms upon which the parties agree even if they are not
expressed in a record, the terms that the UCC supplies or incorporates, and the
terms in the record of a party to which the other party has agreed.290 The
terms of a contract that either one or both parties confirms by a record are the
terms agreed to prior to the confirmation, the terms in the confirming record
that do not materially vary the terms of the agreement and to which the other
party does not object, the terms in the parties' records to the extent they agree,
291
and the terms supplied by the UCC.
Similar to proposed Sections 2-204 and 2-206, proposed Section 2-207
does not explicitly address the enforceability of accept-or-return offers. Furthermore, these sections do not protect a buyer from terms that the seller could
impose by shipping an ordered product to the buyer subject to an accept-orreturn offer. Proposed Section 2-207 does not determine whether the seller
could enforce the terms of an accept-or-return offer because proposed Section
2-207 applies only if the parties' records do not establish a contract or if one
or both of the parties confirms an agreement in writing.' 9 Therefore, because
the Hill approach to contract formation provides that the parties do not form
the contract until after the buyer has examined the terms,2 93 the inclusion of
additional terms upon shipping a product to the buyer would not trigger the
application of proposed Section 2-207.294
287. See supranotes 67-107 and accompanying text (discussing application of Section 2207).
288. U.C.C. § 2-207(b) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
289. Id. § 2-207(c) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
290. Id. § 2-207(b) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
291. Id. § 2-207(c) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
292. See id. § 2-207 (Discussion Draft May 1998) (providing analysis for determining
whether terms become part of contract when terms of acceptance vary from terms of offer, when
conduct of parties establishes contract but their writings do not, and when one or both parties
sends written confirmation).
293. See supra notes 184-96 and accompanying text (detailing Hill approach to contract

formation).

294. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text (discussing application of proposed
Section 2-207).
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B. ProposedStatutory Solution: Sections 2-105(b) and2-204(e)
Recent drafts of the proposed revisions to Article 2 of the UCC indicate
that the drafting committee is considering whether to address the problem of
accept-or-return offers with a specific statutory provision.2 9 Although the
committee has not taken final action concerning this issue, the committee is
considering the following addition to revised Section 2-204:
(e) Subjectto Sections2-207 and2-209(a), if,afterthebuyerhasbecome
obligated to pay for or has taken delivery of the goods, the seller proposes
terms in a record that vary those already disclosed or agreed to and to
which the buyer agrees, the varying terms become part of the contract
unless they are unconscionable under Section 2-105.296
The drafting committee is contemplating the following definition of an unconscionable term:
(b) In a consumer contract [contract between and [sic] individual and a
merchant], non-negotiable [non-negotiated] terms in a record which the
[consumer] [individual] has authenticated or to which it has agreed by
conduct are unconscionable if:
(1) the consumer [individual] had no knowledge of them; and
(2) the term:
(A) varies unreasonably from applicable industry standards or commercial
practices;
(B) substantially conflicts with one or more negotiated terms in the
agreement; or

(C) substantially conflicts with an essential purpose of the contract.297
The interplay of Sections 2-105(b) and 2-204(e) limits the ability of a seller
of goods to add terms to a contract after the sale or after the delivery of the
goods.298 Specifically, the provisions preclude a seller from adding or modify295. See U.C.C. § 2-203 note 5 (Discussion Draft March 1998) (stating that drafting
committee favors statutory solution to "Gateway" problem).

296. U.C.C. § 2-204(e) (Discussion DraftMay 1998). Compare id.§2-204(e) (Discussion
Draft May 1998) (enforcing terms of contract that seller proposes after sale or delivery of goods
unless terms are unconscionable) with U.C.C. § 2B-208(a) (Tentative Draft April 1998)
(refusing to enforce terms of mass-market license unless party agrees to terms prior to initial
performance or prior to using or to accessing information).
297. U.C.C. § 2-105(b) (Discussion Draft May 1998) (brackets in original).
298. See id.; id. § 2-204(e) (Discussion Draft May 1998). The drafting committee has
described proposed Section 2-204(e) as adopting the rolling contract concept. See id. § 2-204
note 5 (Discussion Draft May 1998) (explaining that subsection (e) adopts rolling contract
concept). According to the drafting committee, the rolling contract concept recognizes that
"[c]ontract formation and term definition is aprocess, rather than asingle event." U.C.C. §2B207 note 5 (Tentative Draft April 1998). Although proposed Section 2-204(e) adopts the rolling
contract concept, proposed Section 2-105(b) limits the potential for unfair surprise and bias
from the adherence to this concept by refining the definition of unconscionable. See U.C.C.
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ing terms when the buyer has no knowledge of the new terms and the terms
vary unreasonably from the industry practice or the terms conflict with the
contract's essential purpose or negotiated terms. 299
In order to evaluate whether proposed Sections 2-105(b) and 2-204(e)
provide a workable solution to the problems that accept-or-return offers
create, it is helpful to apply the proposed provisions to the facts of Hill.
According to the language of Section 2-204(e), the apllication of proposed
Section 2-204(e) is subject to proposed Section 2-207 and 2-209(a). 3" In this
case, neither proposed Section 2-207 nor proposed Section 2-209(a) provide
that the arbitration clause necessarily became part of the Hills' contract with
Gateway. Specifically, the arbitration clause would not become part of the
parties' agreement under proposed Section 2-207(c) as part of a written confirmation of a prior agreement because the Hills had not previously agreed to
the term and because the term most likely materially varied the prior agreement. " ' Similarly, proposed Section 2-209(a) would not include the arbitration clause in the parties' contract because the parties did not agree to modify
2
the terms of their agreement.1
Because neither proposed Section 2-207 nor proposed Section 2-209(a)
include the arbitration clause as part of the parties' contract, one must decide
whether proposed Section 2-204(e) dictates the outcome in Hill. Proposed
Section 2-204(e) clearly applies inHillbecause Gateway proposed additional,
nonnegotiable terms to the original agreement when it shipped the product to
the Hills. 3 Because the Hills did not have knowledge of the arbitration
clause prior to the sale or the delivery of the goods,' °4 proposed Section
2-105(b) would characterize the arbitration clause as unconscionable if the
inclusion of an arbitration clause is either unreasonable in the computer retail
industry or contrary to the negotiated terms of the agreement orto the essential purposes of the agreement.05 If the arbitration clause is unconscionable
§ 2-105 note 2 (Discussion Draft May 1998) (stating that proposed definition ofunconscionable
provides more protection for consumers than prior definitions).
299. Id. § 2-105(b) (Discussion Draft May 1998); id. § 2-204(e) (Discussion Draft May

1998).
300. Id. § 2-204(e) (Discussion Draft May 1998). Section 2-209(a) provides: "An agreement made in good faith modifying a contract under this article needs no consideration to be
binding." Id. § 2-209(a) (Discussion Draft May 1998).

301. See supra note 291 and accompanying text (discussing terms of contract in which one
or both parties confirm by record).

302. See supra note 300 (quoting text of Section 2-209(a)).
303. See supranote 5 and accompanying text (explaining that Gateway proposed additional
terms to contract when it shipped computer to Hills).
304. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (stating that Hills did not have notice of
arbitration clause prior to purchasing computer).
305. U.C.C. § 2-105(b) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
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under Section 2-105(b), then Section
2-204(e) would exclude the arbitration
30 6
clause from the parties' contract.
Proposed Sections 2-105(b) and 2-204(e) eliminate the riskthatthe seller
will unilaterally impose terms on the buyer, and as a result, the proposed
sections protect the buyer from unfair surprise.0 7 Specifically, the proposed
sections protect the buyer of goods because the sections require courts to
consider the substance of the terms that a seller attempts to propose after the
sale of goods. 8 The proposed sections, however, do not protect the buyer
solely at the expense of the seller. Rather, the proposed sections enforce
terms proposed by the seller after the buyer has purchased goods so long as
the terms are not unreasonable in the applicable industry or contrary to the
purposes of the contract or the negotiated terms.3 °9 Furthermore, if the seller
makes the terms known to the buyer before the time of sale, the seller's terms
become part of the contract .31 ° Proposed Sections 2-105(b) and 2-204(e),
therefore, provide an incentive for a seller to disclose the complete terms of
its agreement at or prior to the sale. Therefore, proposed Sections 2-105(b)
and 2-204(e) reduce the risk of unfair surprise and eliminate the biased Hill
approach while still allowing the seller to conduct its business effectively.
V Conclusion
At least one court has adopted the Seventh Circuit's liberal approach to
contract formation and has enforced an accept-or-return offer. 1 However, as
the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the Seventh Circuit's approach to contract formation is inconsistent with the policies of the UCC. Moreover, in
addition to being an inaccurate interpretation of the UCC, the Seventh Circuit's enforcement of accept-or-return offers ignores the reasonable expectations of the parties and prefers sellers. Because the Seventh Circuit's ap306. Id. § 2-204(e) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
307. See id. § 2-204(e) note 5 (Discussion Draft May 1998) ("The objective is to reduce
the risk of unfair surprise when a buyer receives previously undisclosed terms after paying for
or taking delivery of the goods."); supra notes 254-61 and accompanying text (discussing
problem of unfair surprise).
308. See U.C.C. § 2-204(e) (Discussion Draft May 1998) (providing that term seller
proposes after sale of goods is unenforceable if unconscionable under Section 2-105).
309. Id. § 2-105(b)(2) (Discussion Draft May 1998).
310. See id. § 2-105 note 2 (Discussion Draft May 1998) ("[I]f a consumer... has
knowledge of the term in a record to which it has agreed, the term is enforceable under 2-105(b)
even though it is harsh, or substantially conflicts with negotiated terms, or eliminates the
essential purposes of the contract.").
311. See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S. 569, 571-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(determining that, similar to clause in Hill, arbitration clause sent by seller with product was
"1simply one provision of the sole contract 'proposed' between the parties" because parties did
not form contract until after buyer retained merchandise for more than 30 days).

1334

55 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 1287 (1998)

proach to accept-or-return offers is unsatisfactory, courts should not adopt the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Hill.
Both the current version of the UCC and the proposed revisions to the
UCC are susceptible to the Seventh Circuit's analysis of accept-or-return
offers. Therefore, the drafting committee to Revised Article 2 should take
notice of the problems inherent in the Seventh Circuit's approach and should
strengthen its efforts to create a specific statutory solution to confront the
Seventh Circuit's approach. In particular, the drafting committee and state
legislatures evaluating whether to adopt Revised Article 2 should adopt a
statutory solution similar to Sections 2-105(b) and 2-204(e) that allows courts
to review the substance of terms that a seller proposes after the point of sale or
after the delivery of the goods when the buyer lacks knowledge of the terms.

